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d e a r  a l u m n i  a n d  f r i e n d s ,
S
pring has come to Provo, albeit with some snow, and final examinations and 
graduation will be upon us shortly. New graduates and students will soon be 
heading off literally all over the world for jobs, summer clerkships, and extern-
ships. Most of us can relate to their feelings of anticipation, excitement, and 
uncertainty as they embark on the challenges that await them.
 I have always viewed learning the law as something like learning to speak a foreign 
language. For the first few weeks of class, we can feel completely at sea and wonder 
whether it will ever be possible to communicate in this new language of the law. Even as we begin to develop a legal vocab-
ulary and to learn a series of doctrines and rules, we still struggle with how to apply the rules to a particular fact pattern. 
We hear a story but don’t simultaneously see the legal issues, ambiguities, alternative narratives, and potential resolutions 
to the problem described in the story. We read a contract but don’t understand the risks or incentives associated with par-
ticular provisions. At the beginning, everything is halting translation. 
 Just like in every foreign language class, most of us remember those in our 1l classes who were stellar law linguists and who, 
for some reason, just got it. Translation seemed to come faster for them; their comments sounded more fluent; and, at times, 
they carried on a conversation with the faculty member that made us wonder whether we were learning the same language.
 But the wonderful thing about learning a foreign language or the language of the law is that both yield up their secrets 
with enough effort. At some point we start hearing and seeing meaning without churning through a cumbersome trans-
lation process. For some this may come more quickly than others, but for all who are willing to work hard, it comes. Of 
course we continue to admire the gifted law linguists among us, but once we learn how to speak, the real question is how 
we use our language. Just like speaking a language doesn’t make the missionary, knowing the law isn’t enough to make the 
lawyer. It’s what you do with the language and what you do with the law that matters.
 For graduates and students that time is now upon them. Although legal fluency is a lifetime’s project—which is part of 
what attracted so many of us to the law—I am confident that our students have all of the language skills they need to succeed. 
 Many of our 1ls will be putting their legal and foreign language skills to use in international settings. This year 48 stu-
dents will do an international externship with placements across the continents in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Australia, 
Europe, and the Middle East. What Professor Jim Backman began as a modest externship program in 1992 has grown into 
a worldwide program with a remarkable breadth of opportunities.
 Our 3ls will graduate and head off for jobs all over the country. Continuing in a long tradition at byu, in 2011, 12 gradu-
ates (a couple from prior years) will start in clerkships with federal appellate and district courts, as well as state supreme 
courts. The geographical distribution of our graduates reflects our national presence.  Typically, about 40 percent of our 
graduates end up in Utah and 60 percent elsewhere.
 Frankly, as is the case in law schools across the country, too many of our 3ls are still looking for work. In my con-
versations with other deans, I have sensed that we are comparatively well off, mainly because of a remarkable network of 
alumni and friends who recognize the quality of our students. Despite our relative strength, an increase in legal employ-
ment opportunities can’t come fast enough for the students and for our Career Services Office, which has been working 
overtime. In addition to increased efforts there and a job initiative in which our alumni have been helpful, last year we cre-
ated a public service fellowship that provides funds for 10 recent graduates to work part-time in public interest and public 
service positions for up to nine months while they continue to search for permanent employment. I appreciate the support 
of alumni and friends to make this possible.
 More than that support, I appreciate the examples of alumni and friends who over the years have used their training 
in the language of the law to comfort, persuade, lead, and serve. As our students leave Provo and spread across the world, 
joined by a strong cadre of students in the Law Society, I am confident that they will continue in this great tradition and 
become not just impressive legal linguists but also committed practitioners of the ennobling work of the law.
        Warm regards,         j a m e s  r .  r a s b a n d
d e a n ’s  m e s s a g e
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et me express, first of all, the honor I feel at being invited to address you this evening. You are 
an audience of accomplished individuals with demonstrated commitment to what is good and 
right. I appreciate your character and your good will.
 It is also a great honor for me to be introduced by a man I respect as highly as Ralph Hardy. I 
first became acquainted with Ralph in the early 1970s when Kathy and I and our two young children 
at the time moved to Maryland following my graduation from law school. During my years in the 
Washington area, Ralph and I practiced law together and served concurrently as bishops. Ralph was 
kind enough to tutor me in things relating to the practice of law as well as to leadership in the Church. 
I learned a great deal from his example that benefits me still today in my current calling and service.
 Ralph’s intellect and judgment are exceptional. Over the years important political figures and 
many others have come to rely on his wisdom. I know from personal observation how highly Ralph 
is regarded among the senior leaders of the Church. His recommendations and insights are regu-
larly sought and gratefully received. We all understand the thoughtfulness and experience behind 
his counsel. I am by no means alone in my conviction that Ralph’s exceptional talent and devotion 
not only do great credit to the legal profession, but, even more important, represent a tremendous 
blessing for The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
 Ralph, I am grateful that you would do me the honor of this introduction in your typically gra-
cious manner, and I take this occasion to express to you publicly my deepest admiration.
 I have titled my remarks this evening “Law and Becoming.” By this I mean to talk about the vital 
role of law in what we may become. In speaking of becoming, I am taking the long view not only of 
what a person may be able to make of himself or herself in the space between birth and death, but 
also of the eternal potential of men and women. And, in speaking of law, I want to reference not 
only matters of our codes and courts but also the laws of God.
 Through revelations granted to the Prophet Joseph and his predecessors, we 
learn some profound things about our relationship to God and our ultimate des-
tiny. We learn that Jesus Christ, as the Son of God, progressed “from grace to 
grace, until he received a fulness”1 and that we may follow in that same path. He 
said, “For if you keep my commandments you shall receive of his fulness, and be 
glorified in me as I am in the Father; therefore, I say unto you, you shall receive grace 
for grace.”2 In explaining the natural conclusion of this pattern, Joseph Smith said:
Here, then, is eternal life—to know the only wise and true God; and you have got to learn how to be gods your-
selves, and to be kings and priests to God, . . . by going from one small degree to another, and from a small capacity 
to a great one; from grace to grace, from exaltation to exaltation, until you attain to the resurrection of the dead, and 
are able to dwell in everlasting burnings, and to sit in glory, as do those who sit enthroned in everlasting power.3
 Joseph Smith also referred to God’s use of law in this process:
 The first principles of man are self-existent with God. God himself, finding he was in the midst of spirits 
and glory, because he was more intelligent, saw proper to institute laws whereby the rest could have a privilege to 
advance like himself. The relationship we have with God places us in a situation to advance in knowledge. He has 
power to institute laws to instruct the weaker intelligences, that they may be exalted with Himself, so that they 
might have one glory upon another.4
 I cite one more teaching from the Prophet that adds the remaining element to this equation—agency:
All persons are entitled to their agency, for God has so ordained it. He has constituted mankind moral agents, and 
given them power to choose good or evil; to seek after that which is good, by pursuing the pathway of holiness in this 
life, which brings peace of mind, and joy in the Holy Ghost here, and a fulness of joy and happiness at His right 
hand hereafter; or to pursue an evil course, going on in sin and rebellion against God, thereby bringing condemna-
tion to their souls in this world, and an eternal loss in the world to come.5
 All of this declares that we have a potential made possible by God beyond anything we can fully 
comprehend or appreciate at present. And we recognize, of course, that none of us will achieve the 
ultimate end, the status of eternal life with God our Father, in a matter of days or years or with-
L
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Introduction of Elder D. 
Todd Christofferson of the 
Quorum of the Twelve  
by elder ralph w.  hardy jr . 
of  the seventy 
On the warm Friday afternoon of 
September 5, 1975, my 30-year-old 
law firm colleague, David Todd 
Christofferson, and I found a place 
behind the already occupied rows 
of metal chairs and sat on the cool, 
green grass in front of the gleaming, 
new J. Reuben Clark Law School 
Building on the byu campus. On a 
sudden impulse we had caught a 
plane in Washington in order to wit-
ness this historic dedication of the 
new law school building by President 
Marion G. Romney—and in the pres-
ence also of byu President Dallin 
Oaks, founding dean Rex Lee, Chief 
Justice Warren Burger, and Justice 
Lewis Powell of the Supreme Court. 
Even though we had studied law 
at other distinguished institutions, 
we knew that this was a seminal 
event and the coming of age of a 
law school that would forever add 
definition and substance to our pro-
fessional lives as well as strength to 
the Church. Little did I realize on that 
beautiful afternoon that I was sitting 
on the grass with a future Apostle 
of the Lord Jesus Christ, although—
already—had someone vouchsafed 
that fact to me, I would not have 
been the least bit surprised.
 I first became acquainted with 
Elder Christofferson when I took a 
taxi to the United States Courthouse 
in Washington to see this newly 
minted, 27-year-old law clerk to u.s. 
District Court Chief Judge John J. 
Sirica. The famous Watergate case 
was still in its infancy, and virtually 
nobody knew the extent to which 
that case would eventually go. I 
was on a recruiting errand. I met 
in the judge’s chambers with this 
bright young lawyer with such a 
pleasing countenance and easy 
smile. Eventually I secured from 
him a commitment to join my law 
firm after what we both assumed 
would be his one-year commitment 
to the judge. I should add that, for 
our firm, as you can imagine, Elder 
Christofferson was a very big “get.” 
In addition to his almost unbeliev-
able clerkship opportunity with 
Judge Sirica, Elder Christofferson 
had been a byu Edwin Hinckley 
scholar, student-body academic vice 
president, an exceptional Duke law 
student, and an editor of the Duke 
Law Journal. 
 Nevertheless, with the growing 
complexity and riveting national 
attention on the Watergate case 
increasing exponentially, the 
standard one-year commitment 
expanded into three years, and 
Judge Sirica would call our firm sev-
eral times to declare, regarding his 
able young law clerk: “I just can’t let 
him go—he’s too valuable. He’s the 
only one I can talk to!” 
  During the long pendency of the 
Watergate case, the Washington Post 
described Elder Christofferson as 
“a former Mormon missionary who 
serves as Judge Sirica’s clerk and alter 
ego” and added that “Todd, now a 
tall, soft-spoken, blond-headed young 
man,” had “served as a missionary 
in Argentina.” In its “1973 Person 
of the Year” cover story on Judge 
Sirica, Time magazine illustrated 
the exceptionally close relationship 
between this judge and his law clerk 
by observing that “while the techni-
cians continued their studies [for 
any evidence of tampering], [Judge 
Sirica] and his young law clerk, Todd 
Christofferson, listened to the [White 
House] tapes through headphones in 
a jury room.” Thirty years later I was 
privileged to be in the completely 
filled ceremonial courtroom of the 
United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit 
to attend a retrospective on the 
Watergate case that featured on the 
dais many of the still-living lawyers, 
television correspondents, and 
defendants in that national drama. 
What was most interesting was the 
attention and great respect that was 
accorded to Elder Christofferson, 
whom everyone remembered well. 
He was, as you would imagine, the 
recipient of many questions—which 
he fielded with his trademark grace, 
humor, and good judgment. When 
Judge Sirica died in 1992, the family 
asked Elder Christofferson to speak 
at his funeral in Washington. What 
counsel would you have expected 
Elder Christofferson, then of the 
Seventy, to have given on that occa-
sion? Yes! It was the doctrine of the 
plan of salvation.
 While residing in the Washington 
d.c. Stake, Elder Christofferson 
soon found himself called as a 
bishop. Then, less than five years 
later, he accepted an exciting pro-
fessional opportunity as in-house 
counsel to a health care company 
in Tennessee. This was followed 
by his appointment as senior vice 
president and general counsel of 
Tennessee’s Commerce Union Bank. 
He was called as a stake president 
in Nashville and, at the end of his 
tenure, became a regional repre-
sentative. Finally, in the rapidly 
consolidating world of banking, 
Elder Christofferson became asso-
ciate general counsel of the giant 
NationsBank in Charlotte, which 
later acquired Bank of America and 
retained that name. We all know 
the rest of the story. The Lord had 
already charted for this able lawyer 
another long-term path. Shortly 
after moving to Charlotte, he was 
called, in 1993, to the First Quorum 
of the Seventy and, in 1998, to the 
Presidency of the Seventy. Then, 
on April 12, 2008, Elder David Todd 
Christofferson was ordained to an 
apostleship. I have dwelled some-
what on the early judicial clerkship 
of a young Elder Christofferson 
because this unique experience—
occurring at the very epicenter of 
perhaps the greatest American 
political crisis since the Civil War—
helped refine the keen instincts, 
exceptional scholarship, sound 
judgment, and advocacy skills that 
would enhance both his successful 
professional career and his minis-
try. This being said, however, what 
many in the world would not know 
is that, more than any other factor, 
Elder Christofferson’s mode of life 
and careful approach to his many 
responsibilities have been informed 
through the tutelage of the Spirit.
  Elder Christofferson’s best friend 
and confidant (who is here with us 
tonight) is the love of his life and his 
eternal companion, Kathy, whom 
he married in the Salt Lake Temple 
in 1968. The Christoffersons have 
been blessed with five children and 
nine grandchildren. Throughout his 
nearly 18-year ministry as a General 
Authority, Elder Christofferson, with 
uncommon, understated eloquence 
and precision, has given inspired 
counsel on many important gospel 
topics. For aspiring and current 
lawyers, however, his addresses 
and writings have been particularly 
insightful. This evening, J. Reuben 
Clark Law Society is highly honored 
to have the privilege of hearing the 
instruction of this servant of the Lord 
and fellow member of the bar.
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out substantial help. We require the help of one another and an incalculable measure of divine grace 
originating in Christ and administered through the Holy Ghost. Nevertheless, our own choices will 
always be critical to what we become. And the capacity and power to choose are, as Joseph Smith 
declared, dependent on laws instituted by or under the authority of God.
 Such laws link particular actions to fixed outcomes. If a given choice did not always and invari-
ably yield the same result, we could not in the end control outcomes, and the power to choose 
would be meaningless. And even with law, if we are not free to act, either to follow or reject it, we 
likewise could not use law to progress from grace to grace. I believe that Satan’s proposals in the 
premortal world attacked both of these principles. He wanted to be vested with a power of compul-
sion over the souls of men and with the honor or power of God:
 And I, the Lord God, spake unto Moses, saying: That Satan, whom 
thou hast commanded in the name of mine Only Begotten, is the same which 
was from the beginning, and he came before me, saying—Behold, here am I, 
send me, I will be thy son, and I will redeem all mankind, that one soul shall 
not be lost, and surely I will do it; wherefore give me thine honor.6
 Had Satan been granted power to dictate our choices, we would 
have become nothing more than his puppets, eternally dependent upon 
him. It is my personal opinion that in demanding “Give me thine honor,” 
Satan was also coveting God’s power to establish the law, and that it was 
his intention to use that power arbitrarily—to apply, revoke, and change 
laws in an arbitrary fashion that would destroy our power to act indepen-
dently and to choose our destiny. For whatever reason, Satan was excep-
tionally persuasive in lobbying for his approach. Happily, his plan was rejected, 
although echoes continue to reverberate in the world around us.
 The deities of ancient Greek and Roman mythology were often arbitrary beings. While they 
were supposed to possess remarkable powers, they were ruled by their passions. As they fought and 
jockeyed for position among themselves, or simply vented feelings of lust, anger, or frustration, 
mere mortals were sometimes caught in the cross fire. We can be grateful, to say the least, that the 
true and living God is nothing like the imaginary Zeus or Jupiter.
 The scripture states, “There are many kingdoms. . . . And unto every kingdom is given a law; 
and unto every law there are certain bounds also and conditions.”7 Apparently, laws with their con-
ditions and bounds may vary in different kingdoms or spheres—as, for example, the laws of the 
several kingdoms that prevail in our postmortal life. The Lord says that His celestial kingdom is 
populated by those who are “sanctified through the law which I have given unto you, even the law 
of Christ,”8 and that those who cannot abide this celestial law must inherit a lesser kingdom whose 
law they are able and willing to follow.9 While differing laws may apply in different parts of God’s 
creation, the laws that do apply do not themselves vary. Such beings and creations as are subject to 
them can rely on them to achieve their divine potential. We are told that those who are governed by 
law are preserved, perfected, and sanctified by the same.10
 Under the umbrella of divine law and order applicable to the “kingdom” that is our present mor-
tal world, God delegates to us, His children, the opportunity and responsibility to establish laws 
and legal systems to govern human relations and conduct. Let me quote from section 134 of the 
Doctrine and Covenants:
 We believe that governments were instituted of God for the benefit of man; and that he holds men accountable 
for their acts in relation to them, both in making laws and administering them, for the good and safety of society.
 We believe that no government can exist in peace, except such laws are framed and held inviolate as will secure 
to each individual the free exercise of conscience, the right and control of property, and the protection of life.11
 These standards—(1) that laws are to be made and administered for “the good and safety of soci-
ety” and (2) that they must secure to each individual the rights of life, property, and conscience—
bespeak a legal environment in which man may progress toward his divine destiny, to become what 
God has ordained he may become. They establish the stability, order, and means whereby each 
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individual may exercise moral agency. They produce a setting wherein each person, if he or she so 
desires, can “come unto Christ, and be perfected in him”12 and all that that entails.
 In the infant days of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the Lord expressed 
in a revelation to Joseph Smith the wisdom and benefit of organizing the Church and its work 
“according to the laws of man; That your enemies may not have power over you; that you may be 
preserved in all things; that you may be enabled to keep my laws.”13 I read this to mean that, as a 
general principle, submission to the laws of man will offer very real protections, providing in effect 
a safe haven within which we can act to obey and serve God.
 In his book The Clash of Orthodoxies, Robert P. George has an interesting chapter titled “What 
Is Law?” He examines the debates among legal thinkers and philosophers in the English-speaking 
world over the last century, beginning with Oliver Wendell Holmes, about the origins and nature 
of law. He cites, for example, the group whose legal realist movement flourished to some extent in 
the 1930s and 1940s. These scholars debunked the idea of legal objectivity; to be realistic, they main-
tained, we “should abandon the idea that law pre-exists and is available to guide legal decisions.”14 
They argued that judges’ reasoning and citation of laws as the basis of their decisions are in reality 
“mere legal rationalization of decisions reached on other grounds.”15
 George reviews other theories such as “legal positivism,” which in some versions holds to “the 
idea that law ought not to embody or enforce moral judgments.”16 Other proponents, however, 
acknowledge that the content of legal rules reflects “nothing so much as the moral judgments pre-
vailing in any society regarding the subject matters regulated by law.”17 For George himself, “legal 
rules and principles function as practical reasons for citizens, as well as judges and other officials, 
because the citizens appreciate their moral value.”18 He subscribes to the proposition lex iniusta non 
est lex (an unjust law is not law), by which he means, if I understand him correctly, that it is essential 
for the laws and legal systems created by man to have a basis in natural law or morality.19
 In his 1993 encyclical letter titled “Veritatis Splendor,” Pope John Paul II expressed the relevant 
Catholic doctrine in these words:
Only by obedience to universal moral norms does man find full confirmation of his personal uniqueness and the 
possibility of authentic moral growth. . . . These norms in fact represent the unshakable foundation and solid guar-
antee of a just and peaceful human coexistence, and hence of genuine democracy, which can come into being and 
develop only on the basis of the equality of all its members, who possess common rights and duties. When it is a 
matter of the moral norms prohibiting intrinsic evil, there are no privileges or exceptions for anyone. It makes no 
difference whether one is the master of the world or the “poorest of the poor” on the face of the earth. Before the 
demands of morality we are all absolutely equal.20
 Latter-day Saints would necessarily be included among those who believe in preexisting and uni-
versal natural law—or, as we might express it, law rooted in the preexisting justice and order of God. 
I firmly agree that insofar as humanly possible, man’s laws and legal systems should be tied to God’s 
laws and should reflect the same ultimate purpose: to foster our becoming all that we can become 
here and hereafter. People instinctively appreciate the value of law that has valid moral underpin-
nings because it is in their nature as spiritual beings and children of God—the ultimate moral Being. 
The light of Christ that we sometimes call conscience lights every person who comes into this world.21
 Some of you may be thinking, “This is all very grand, but where, for example, 
does tax law fit in?” I would answer that it probably does not, since tax codes are the 
work of the devil, right? But in all seriousness, even the very mundane can have a role 
if it is supportive of—or at least not inconsistent with—overarching divine principles 
and purpose. The Uniform Commercial Code, for example, would seem to have little 
if any contribution to make in helping us achieve our divine potential, but even something 
so unethereal can have value as part of a larger legal structure that supports fundamental fairness, mini-
mizes strife, rewards honest labor, preserves stable families, and, ultimately, enshrines moral agency.
 Returning again to the Doctrine and Covenants:
 We believe that all governments necessarily require civil officers and magistrates to enforce the laws of the same; 
and that such as will administer the law in equity and justice should be sought for and upheld by the voice of the 
people if a republic, or the will of the sovereign.22
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 Here, more specifically, we come to many of you in the profession of law. You live in societies 
where the system of “civil officers and magistrates” includes judges and lawyers who occupy a vital 
role in administering the law “in equity and justice.” You whose first loyalty is to God can press in a 
variety of ways for laws and systems that track the divine model or that at least do not undermine it. 
Let me be clear that I am not speaking of any endeavor to impose upon society by some sort of fiat 
what we see as the appropriate application of divinely revealed principles. We cannot, and we make 
no attempt to do so. I am speaking of advocacy and persuasion. At the same time, it will not do 
to pretend that an individual or group may not participate in the debates and processes that shape 
our laws simply because their arguments are based on moral norms or because their moral vision is 
not shared by all citizens. Essentially all legislation is based on moral judgments—religious, secular, 
or otherwise, and all parties to the ongoing contest seek to have their ethical and moral concerns 
heard. In the end we are governed by those that prevail in the public mind. It is not an imposition of 
religion for religionists to take part in the discussion, and there is no justice in one side with deeply 
held values seeking to silence another because it espouses different deeply held values.
 Consider the example of William Wilberforce and others of his time who sought to conform 
the laws of Great Britain to a higher moral standard of equity and justice. Wilberforce is rightly 
remembered and revered for his central role in the abolition of the slave trade that was then domi-
nated by British ships. For some 18 years, beginning in 1789, he labored as a member of Parliament 
to end this evil commerce and lay the groundwork for the abolition of slavery altogether:
 Wilberforce’s involvement in the abolition movement was motivated by a desire to put his 
Christian principles into action and to serve God in public life. . . . [He] sensed a call from 
God, writing in a journal entry in 1787 that “God Almighty has set before me two great 
objects, the suppression of the Slave Trade and the Reformation of Manners [moral values].”23
 Initially, Wilberforce’s bills in the House of Commons were easily defeated. 
Then, just as momentum began to build, the French Revolution and slave revolts in 
the West Indies caused a shift back to caution and delay. During the protracted campaign, 
“Wilberforce’s commitment never wavered, despite frustration and hostility. He was supported in 
his work by fellow members of the so-called Clapham Sect. . . . Holding evangelical Christian con-
victions, and consequently dubbed ‘the Saints,’ the group lived in large adjoining houses in 
Clapham.”24 Finally, in 1807, Wilberforce’s Abolition Bill passed the House of Lords and was pre-
sented to the House of Commons. “As tributes were made to Wilberforce, whose face streamed 
with tears, the bill was carried by 283 votes to 16.”25
 It is significant to recognize that while Wilberforce, as a member of Parliament, took the lead-
ing role in official circles, the active and devoted efforts of many others with no political portfo-
lio were essential to success in the campaign to end the slave trade. The collaboration of Thomas 
Clarkson, a fellow graduate of Wilberforce at St. John’s Cambridge, was especially important. 
Also critical was the part played by members of the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave 
Trade, a group made up primarily of like-minded British Quakers and Anglicans that included 
Clarkson and that Wilberforce joined in 1791.
 The society was highly successful in raising public awareness and support, and local chapters sprang up 
throughout Great Britain. Clarkson travelled the country researching and collecting firsthand testimony and sta-
tistics, while the committee promoted the campaign, pioneering techniques such as lobbying, writing pamphlets, 
holding public meetings, gaining press attention, organizing boycotts and even using a campaign logo: an image 
of a kneeling slave above the motto “Am I Not a Man and a Brother?” designed by the renowned pottery-maker 
Josiah Wedgwood. The committee also sought to influence slave-trading nations such as France, Spain, Portugal, 
Denmark, Holland and the United States, corresponding with anti-slavery activists in other countries and organ-
ising the translation of English-language books and pamphlets. These included books by former slaves Ottobah 
Cugoano and Olaudah Equiano, who had published influential works on slavery and the slave trade in 1787 and 
1789, respectively. They and other free blacks, collectively known as “Sons of Africa,” spoke at debating societies 
and wrote spirited letters to newspapers, periodicals and prominent figures, as well as public letters of support to 
campaign allies. . . . The campaign proved to be the world’s first grassroots human rights campaign, in which men 
and women from different social classes and backgrounds volunteered to end the injustices suffered by others.26
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 William Wilberforce and his allies provide an encouraging example of success after much 
labor and against daunting opposition. Not every effort, however, will succeed—at least not ini-
tially. Consider a more recent example in the arena of things that bear on marriage and families 
and the rearing of children. The “no-fault” divorce laws that have been adopted in the United 
States and elsewhere were warned against decades ago by President David O. 
McKay and others. The disastrous consequences visited on the institution of mar-
riage since then are clearly evident, with children being the primary victims—
some of whom, given their suffering, are now reluctant to marry and rear families 
themselves. But whatever the setbacks in our striving to sustain family or other 
moral imperatives among our fellowman, surely we must, as Paul declared, fight 
the good fight.27 Mohammed is reported to have said, “Who[so]ever sees a wrong and 
is able to put it right with his hand, let him do so; if he can’t, then with his tongue; if he can’t, then 
in his heart, and that is the bare minimum of faith.”28
 Of all the moral imperatives we seek to embrace and defend in our legal systems, in my opin-
ion it is individual agency and accountability that must always be preeminent, because agency is 
so basic to realizing our God-given potential. On the one hand, we should uphold those legal and 
political concepts that protect legitimate individual action, and, on the other, we should oppose 
those theories and schemes that exert unjust dominion or diminish predictability and consistency in 
the operation of law. True, there is some degree of compulsion in any law, but generally it is the kind 
designed to preserve space and opportunity for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Other pro-
posals, however, look to compel our acceptance or tolerance of actions that offend the moral con-
science. A potential example would be the case of a doctor being forced to participate in an abortion 
against his or her conscientious objection on pain of forfeiting the right to practice medicine.
 All man-made legal systems are imperfect and include elements of injustice. Still, you can strive 
to make the legal system within which you live and work come as close as possible to the perfectly 
just “legal system” of God. You can take as your guide not only the wisdom of similarly minded men 
and women from the past but also the teachings of the scriptures, prophets, and the Holy Spirit. In 
this, as in other matters, you are invited to study out in your own mind concepts regarding the stan-
dards, direction, and even the specifics of what the law should be, how the legal system should be 
structured, and how it should operate and then to ask God if it be right.29 Surely you are entitled in 
your role and sphere to revelation on things that bear so directly on 
not only the present estate of man but also his ultimate future.
 God finds His glory, as Joseph Smith said, in providing laws 
by which other beings can come to enjoy the same perfections 
and glory He possesses.30 Our view and motivations should be the 
same. Rather than seeing law as an instrument of domination, it is 
our mission to use it as an enabling power to help men and women 
achieve greater independence and ultimate potential. We do so by 
acting to have our earthly governmental and legal systems mirror as 
closely as possible the divine order.
 After all I have said in praise of law and all the effort I have 
enjoined you to make in sustaining and defending a moral order, we 
must in the end acknowledge that we cannot achieve ultimate jus-
tice apart from Jesus Christ. To establish and preserve the law is a great 
good, but the greatest good we can do in helping others become what they 
can become will be to lead them to the Savior. Only His Atonement has the 
power to overcome all weakness and imperfection and to make right all injustice. Only He can 
convert offense and injury into blessings; only He can bring life again to a life unjustly cut short; 
only He can return a perfect body for one diseased or malformed; only He can reinstate beloved 
associations lost and make them permanent; only He can make right the suffering entailed upon 
the innocent by ignorance and oppression; only He can erase the impact of sin on one who is 
wronged; only He can remove the stain and effect of sin in the sinner; only He can eliminate sor-
row and wipe away all tears;31 only He can provide immortality; only His grace can compensate 
for our inadequacy and justify us before that law that enables us to become joint heirs of eternal 
life with Him. Of the glorious reality of the living Christ, I bear my witness.
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e have many 1ls here today who are already worrying about final exams. During my first year, 
my wife, Marie, and I lived in a little apartment on 13th East in Salt Lake City. We were expect- 
ing our first baby, Jonathan, who is now an active worker in the byu Law School Alumni 
Association and whose daughter Sarah is here today.
 As finals approached, I was so consumed by my daily study routine that it was like living 
in a diving bell. I just lived at my little worktable, constantly briefing cases and preparing out-
lines. I knew our baby would come soon, but my mind was elsewhere. Then one night I had 
this really vivid dream. I saw myself in my study nook, slaving away. I thought somebody was 
watching me. I looked over my shoulder and saw Marie standing in the doorway with a little 
boy who was about seven years old.
 I said, “Is that our new baby?” She said, “Yes.” I replied, “Well, he’s pretty old, isn’t he?” 
She said, “Yes, and we’re sorry to disturb you—we know you’ve got to study. We just have 
one little question. Then we’ll leave you alone. You haven’t had time to give our boy a name in 
Church, and it’s becoming kind of a problem.”
 I looked at this forlorn-looking child. “You don’t have a name?” He said, “No . . . no, Dad, 
but it’s okay. You need to study.” I said, “Well, are you in school?” “Yeah. I’m in second grade.” 
“Well, if you are in school, the kids have to call you something. What do they call you?” and 
he said, “Vargel.” “Vargel?!” I asked. “Do you like that name?” “Well, it’s okay. . . .” I awoke 
clawing the air. In the morning I said to Marie, “When is the next fast Sunday?”
 First-year law students are often frustrated to discover that our legal system is character-
ized not by hard, fast rules but by legal principles that often appear to contradict each other. 
One new student said he had a “low tolerance for ambiguity.” He had recently returned from 
a mission, where his life was highly structured. But in law school he felt totally at sea, groping 
to find whatever would tell him all the rules of law. Let’s put his questions into a larger per-
spective. Ambiguity is not only part of law school—it is often part of life.
 When we are young, most of us tend to think in terms of black or white; there isn’t much 
gray in our perspective. So most younger lds adults have a childlike optimism and a loyalty that 
make them wonderfully teachable. One older byu student said that one thing he likes about 
being in a student ward full of freshmen and sophomores is that when topics like faith or 
repentance are discussed, nobody yawns.
 As time goes on, however, experience often introduces a new dimension to our perspec-
tive. We may begin to see a kind of gap between the real and the ideal, between what is and 
what ought to be.
 Imagine two circles, one inside the other. The inner boundary is “the real,” or what is. The 
outer boundary is “the ideal,” or what ought to be. We stand at the inner boundary of reality, 
reaching to move our reality closer to the ideal. We first see the gap between these two bound-
aries when we realize that some things about ourselves or others are not what we expected—
or what we wish they were. This realization can be frustrating.
W
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 Even our experience with Church institutions can introduce us to this gap, in part because 
our idealistic expectations may be very high. For example, a new byu student may find it hard 
to be one among 30,000 students battling the red-tape machine that seems to control the pro-
cesses of admission, registering for classes, or transferring credits from another school. A new 
student may feel unknown and nameless to a student ward bishop who is inundated with many 
new ward members all at once. Or he may brush up against a faculty member whose attitudes 
about the Church are more flexible (or more rigid) than he had expected them to be.
 At a more personal level, perhaps an important prayer goes too long unanswered or one 
suffers a surprise health setback or an unexpected conflict with a family member. Perhaps one 
becomes conscious of the imperfections of other Church members or leaders or of one’s own 
parents. When we become acquainted at an adult level with those who have been our heroes, 
we naturally begin to see their human limitations. Or perhaps one has an encounter with anti-
Mormon literature or one discovers differing doctrinal views among Church leaders.
 Experiences like these can produce uncertainty and ambivalence—in a word, ambiguity—
and we may yearn for simpler, easier times when life was more clear and felt more under our 
control. We might sense within ourselves the beginnings of skepticism, of unwillingness to 
respond to authority or to invitations to commit ourselves to demanding goals or projects.
 Not everybody will encounter what I have been describing, and not everyone must 
encounter it. But sooner or later, many Church members do run into at least some forms of 
ambiguity. Our basic doctrines are clear, potent, and unambiguous. But we can encounter 
some uncertainty even in studying the scriptures. Consider, for example, when Nephi took 
Laban’s life in order to obtain the brass plates. That exceptional case is not easy to interpret 
w e  r e a l i z e  t h a t 
s o m e  t h i n g s  
a b o u t  o u r s e l v e s  
o r  o t h e r s  
a r e  n o t  w h a t
 w e  e x p e c t e d .
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until the reader realizes that God Himself, who gave the original commandment not to kill, 
was also the source of Nephi’s instructions.
 Consider also the case of Peter on the night he denied any knowledge of his Master. We 
typically regard Peter as something of a coward. We assume his commitment wasn’t strong 
enough to make him rise to the Savior’s defense. But I once heard President Spencer W. 
Kimball say that the Savior’s statement that Peter would deny Him three times just might 
have been a request to Peter, not a prediction. Jesus might have been instructing His chief 
Apostle to deny knowing Him in order to ensure strong leadership for the Church after the 
Crucifixion. So perhaps we shouldn’t judge Peter too quickly.
 Consider other scriptures. The Lord has said that He “cannot look upon sin with the least 
degree of allowance” (d&c 1:31). Yet elsewhere He said,” I have forgiven you your sins” (d&c 
64:3) and “Neither do I condemn thee: go, and sin no more” (John 8:11). Justice is indeed a divine 
law, but so is the doctrine of mercy. At times these two correct principles can seem inconsis-
tent, until the unifying higher principles of the Atonement bring them together.
 God has given us correct principles by which we may govern ourselves, yet these very prin-
ciples may at times be in conflict. Choosing between two principled alternatives (two “goods”) 
is more difficult than choosing in a stark and obvious contrast between good and evil.
 A common question among law students (and lawyers) is how to balance one’s duties to 
family, Church, and school or profession. One young mother had a large family, a responsible 
Church calling, and a busy husband. She was bewildered about what should come first in her 
life and when. Someone told her, “Well, just be sure you put the Lord’s work first.” Her reply: 
“But what if it is all the Lord’s work?”
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ity—and thereby removing the gap. They cling to the ideal so single-mindedly that 
they just don’t feel the frustration that would come from facing the real facts—per-
haps about themselves, about others, or about the world around them. People in this 
group have sometimes written letters to the editor of the Daily Universe expressing 
their shock at discovering that something at byu falls short of perfection.
 Those in this group struggle to distinguish between imperfections that matter a 
great deal and those that may not matter much. For instance, Hugh Nibley once said 
that some people think it is better to get up at 5:00 a.m. to write a bad book than to get 
up at 9:00 a.m. to write a good book. While self-discipline is a virtue, he didn’t think 
the exact hour when we arise is quite as important as what we do once we are up.
 I recall listening to a group of young Church members discussing which of the 
two types of people just described offered the best model for their emulation. They 
felt they had to choose between being relaxed, carefree, and happy about every-
thing in life or being an intense, uncompromising perfectionist. As I listened, I 
began to see that both categories suffer from the same limitation. There isn’t much 
real difference between a forced superficial happiness and a frantic concern with 
apparent perfection.
 Both perspectives lack depth; they understand things too quickly, and they draw 
conclusions from their experience too easily. Neither is well prepared for adversity, 
and I fear that the first strong wind that comes along will blow them over. Their roots 
haven’t sunk deep enough into the soil of experience to establish a firm foundation. 
Both groups reflect the thinness of a philosophy that is untempered by common sense. 
 Church and family life are not the only topics in which the right answer is not always on 
the tip of our tongues. Think about the recent u.s. war in Iraq. With the hindsight of a few 
years, was that war a colossal mistake or was it a heroic act of liberating a nation? Or consider 
whether we should sell everything except what is truly necessary for our survival and donate 
our surplus to those with far greater needs than ours. We might also ask how much governmen-
tal intervention into the regulation of business and private life is too much—or not enough.
 The people on the extreme sides of such questions often seem very certain about the right 
answer. But some people would rather be certain than right.
 We also encounter ambiguity in literature. One byu teacher said that great literature will 
usually raise a profound question, explore the question skillfully, then leave the matter for the 
reader to resolve. If the resolution seems too clear or too simple, maybe the literature isn’t very 
good or perhaps the reader has missed its point.
 So life is full of ambiguities, because some uncertainty is characteristic of the mortal expe-
rience. The mists of darkness in Lehi’s dream symbolize life as we face it on this planet. There 
are, thankfully, many things in mortality that are very certain and very clear—beautifully rep-
resented by the iron rod in Lehi’s dream. But much complexity still surrounds us.
 Given, then, the existence of a gap for most of us between where we stand and where we 
would like to be, and given that we will have at least some experiences that make us wonder 
what to do, I suggest three ascending levels of dealing with ambiguity.
 At level one, I’ve noticed two typical atti- 
tudes. One of them occurs when we simply 
do not—perhaps cannot—even see the prob-
lems that exist. Some people seem almost 
consciously to filter out any perception of 
a gap between the real and the ideal. For 
them, the gospel at its best is a firm hand-
shake, an enthusiastic greeting, and a smiley 
button. Their mission was the best, their 
ward is the best, and every new day is proba-
bly going to be the best day they ever had. 
These cheerful ones are happy, spontaneous, 
and optimistic, and they always manage 
to hang loose and relax. They are able to 
weather many storms that seem formidable 
to more pessimistic types, although one 
wonders if they have somehow missed hear-
ing that a storm is going on.
 A second group at level one has a differ-
ent problem with the gap between what is 
and what ought to be. This group eliminates 
the distance between the real and the ideal 
by, in effect, erasing the inner circle of real-
t h e  m i s t s  o f  d a r k n e s s  i n  
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It would help them if they were more realistic about life, even if that took them out of their 
comfort zone. That discomfort—the very discomfort you feel with law school’s ambiguity and 
in life—can motivate you to lean into the wind and experience some real growth. After all, the 
true Church is intended not only to comfort the afflicted but also to afflict the comfortable.
 Let us then step up to level two, where we see what Jacob called “things as they really are” 
(Jacob 4:13). Only then can we deal with reality in a meaningful and constructive way. If we 
are not willing to grapple with the frustration that comes from facing bravely the uncertainties 
we encounter, we may never develop the kind of spiritual maturity that is necessary to reach 
our ultimate destination. Heber C. Kimball once said that the Church must yet pass through 
some very close places and that those who are living on “borrowed light” will not be able to 
stand when those days come (in Orson F. Whitney, Life of Heber C. Kimball [Salt Lake City: 
Bookcraft, 1967], 450). What is borrowed light? It is living off someone else’s testimony and 
not really dealing with whatever the issues are for you.
 So we must learn how to form judgments of our own about the value of ideas, oppor-
tunities, or people who may come into our lives. We can’t depend on somebody else’s light 
to tell us whether a certain idea is “Church approved,” because new ideas don’t always come 
along with little tags attached saying whether they have been reviewed at Church headquar-
ters. Whether in the form of music, books, friends, or opportunities to serve, there is much 
that is lovely or of good report or praiseworthy that is not the subject of detailed discussion in 
Church manuals, conference talks, or courses of instruction. Those who aren’t open to people 
or experiences that are not obviously related to some Church word or program may well live 
less abundant lives—and make fewer contributions—than the Lord intends.
 One of today’s cultural soft spots is that we live in the age of the sound bite. If you can’t 
express a thought in a short phrase or reduce it to a quick text message, some think it must 
not matter very much. Be careful about that. That reductionist approach can destroy real 
thought, impairing our capacity to think about what is going on and to help solve real prob-
lems. Don’t just pick the label that kind of seems “in.”
 We must develop enough independence and judgment that we are ready for the shafts of 
adversity and contradiction that may come to us. When those times come, we can’t be living 
on borrowed light. Don’t be deceived by the clear-cut labels others may use to describe cir-
cumstances that are, in fact, not so clear. Our encounters with reality and disappointment are 
actually vital stages in the development of our maturity and understanding.
 Now, having considered the value of a level-two awareness, there are still some serious 
hazards at this stage. One’s acceptance of the clouds of uncertainty may be so complete that 
the iron rod seems to fade into the blurring mists and skepticism becomes a guiding philoso-
phy. This perspective can come from erasing the outer circle representing the ideal, or what 
ought to be, and then focusing too much on the inner circle of reality. Sometimes you want 
to eliminate the frustration of the gap between the real and the ideal by just giving up on your 
ideals. And you can be persuaded to do that by your disappointment in seeing what some peo-
ple do with their ideals when they are too shallow about them.
 I spoke earlier of a new law student’s low tolerance for ambiguity. But I also saw that by 
the time our law students reached their third year of study, some of them could develop such 
a high tolerance for ambiguity that they were skeptical about everything. Where formerly 
they felt that they had all the answers but just didn’t know what the questions were, now 
they seemed to have all of the questions but few of the answers. Who wants answers? Isn’t 
law school only about questions?
 People who take too much delight in their finely honed tools of skepticism and dispassionate 
analysis will limit their effectiveness in law practice, at home, in Church, and elsewhere because 
they can become contentious, arrogant, and unwilling to commit themselves. I have seen—and I 
suspect you have seen—some of them try out their new intellectual tools in a Church classroom. 
A well-meaning teacher will make a point that the skeptic considers a little silly, so he yields to an 
irresistible urge to leap to his feet and publicly deflate the teacher’s momentum.
 These overly analytical types always look for opportunities to point out the exception to 
any rule anybody can state. They delight in cross-examining the unsuspecting mother-in-law. 
Or someone offers a good idea in gospel doctrine class, and they see a clever way to shoot it 
l e a d,  k i n dly l ig h t
Lead, kindly Light, amid th’encircling gloom;
Lead thou me on!
The night is dark, and I am far from home;
Lead thou me on!
Keep thou my feet; I do not ask to see
The distant scene—one step enough for me.
I was not ever thus, nor pray’d that thou
Shouldst lead me on.
I loved to choose and see my path; but now,
Lead thou me on!
I loved the garish day, and, spite of fears,
Pride ruled my will. Remember not past years.
So long thy pow’r hath blest me, sure it still
Will lead me on
O’er moor and fen, o’er crag and torrent, till
The night is gone.
And with the morn those angel faces smile,
Which I have loved long since, and lost awhile!
TEXT John Henry Newman, 1801–1890
MUSIC John B. Dykes, 1823–1876
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assigned to work with a brand-new missionary. Just after he arrived, I was called to a meeting 
in another city. He stayed to work in our city with another new missionary whose companion 
went with me. We thought it would be good for their character to tract. There was no mtc in 
those days, so these two knew only a couple of sentences in German between them.
 After returning, I asked how his day had gone. He said eagerly that they had found a 
woman who would surely join the Church. They hadn’t really talked with her, because she 
spoke no English. But he felt an unusually strong spiritual impression about her and her fam-
ily. In our mission it was rare to see anyone join the Church, let alone a whole family. I asked 
for more details, but in his excitement he had forgotten to write down either the name or the 
address. He knew only that they were on the top floor of a five-story apartment house, and he 
thought he’d recognize the name next to the doorbell.
 “Great,” I thought, contemplating all those flights of polished staircases. I explained that 
people who are polite don’t necessarily intend to join the Church. But off we went to find 
her. He couldn’t remember the street name either, so we picked a likely spot in our tracting 
area and began climbing stairs.
 After a frustrating couple of hours, I decided I had to level with him. Based on my 
months of experience, I said it simply wasn’t worth our time to hunt any longer. Stunned, 
Elder Keeler said, “I told you what I felt about her. Are you telling me we’re not going to find 
her?” I tried patiently to explain the realities of missionary work in Europe. His eyes filled with 
tears as he said, “I came on my mission to find the honest in heart. The Spirit told me that that 
woman will someday be a member of the Church. Won’t you help me find her?” I mumbled 
something like, “Maybe the Spirit was just telling you to write down the name and address.”
 So I raced him up one staircase after another. “Elder Keeler, had enough?” “No,” he said. 
“We’ve got to find her.” I stepped up the pace and decided to move so fast he would beg to 
stop—then maybe he would get the message. Finally, out of breath on a fifth floor, he saw the 
name by a doorbell and said, “I think that’s the one!” She came to the door. He jabbed my ribs 
with his elbow and whispered, “That’s the woman! Talk to her!”
down. Then they sit there chortling because they have popped another idealistic bubble that 
people were liking until they heard the skeptical question. When some of those bubbles pop, 
out goes much of the feeling of trust, loyalty, harmony, and sincerity so essential to preserv-
ing the Spirit of the Lord.
 If that begins to happen in our ward, in our home, or in our marriage, we may be eroding 
the fragile fabric of trust that binds us together in all loving relationships. People may come 
away from their encounters with us wondering how we can possibly have a deep commit-
ment to the gospel and say some of the things we say.
 I am not saying we should always just smile and nod our approval, implying that every-
thing is wonderful and that our highest hope is for everybody to have a nice day. That is level 
one. I am encouraging us to realize the potential for harm as well as good that can come with 
what education and experience can do to our minds and our way of dealing with other people.
 These dangers are not limited to our relations with others. They can become very per-
sonal, prying into our own hearts in unhealthy ways. The ability to acknowledge ambiguity 
is not a final form of enlightenment. Once our increased tolerance and patience enable us to 
look longer and harder at difficult questions and pat answers, we must be careful that our 
basic posture toward spiritual things doesn’t shift from being committed to being noncom-
mittal. That is not a healthy posture.
 Many people these days think it is naïve to be committed to such basic ideals as marriage 
or professionalism or patriotism. For instance, it is increasingly popular for people to feel 
hemmed in by marriage commitments; they prefer what some call a “nonbinding commit-
ment,” a term that sounds quite trendy. But I don’t know what a nonbinding commitment is. 
And I don’t think that the people who use that term know what it is either. It just sort of gives 
them an escape. They think they can have it both ways: being committed but not being com-
mitted. Be careful about that.
 Indeed, in many ways, a Church member who moves from a stage of commitment to a 
stage of being tentative and noncommittal is in a worse position than one who has never expe-
rienced a basic commitment. The previously 
committed person may too easily assume he 
has already been through the “positive men-
tal attitude” routine and “knows better” now, 
as he judges. He may assume that being sub-
missive, meek, obedient, and humble is the 
“been there, done that” part of his life and he 
has now outgrown the need to be that way 
again. Those are the assumptions of a hard-
ened heart. In spiritual things—in our rela-
tionship with the Lord, the scriptures, and 
the Church—the shift from being commit-
ted to being noncommittal can actually be a 
switch from one shallow extreme to another.
 I once learned quite a lesson about the 
way a highly developed tolerance for “being 
realistic” can inhibit the workings of the 
Spirit in our lives. When I had been on my 
mission in Germany about a year, I was 
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 That was over 40 years ago. Not long ago Marie and I were with that woman, her hus-
band, and all of their four children and their spouses in the Frankfurt Temple. We saw the 
father, now a temple sealer, seal their youngest daughter and her new husband for eternity. The 
mother has been a Relief Society president. The father has been a bishop. Three of the children 
have served missions, and all four have married other faithful Europeans in the temple. Her 
grandson was in our home in Utah this summer, and he has just received his mission call.
 That experience is a lesson I can never forget about the limitations of skepticism and a 
tolerance for ambiguity. I hope that I will never be so aware of reality that I am unrespon-
sive to heavenly whisperings. So, be realistic, be honest and open, but don’t let those things 
harden your heart.
 The most productive response to ambiguity is at level three, where we see things not only 
with our eyes wide open but with our hearts wide open as well. When we do that, there will be 
many times when we need to take action, even though we want more evidence before knowing 
exactly what to do. Such occasions may range from following the counsel of the Brethren when 
we don’t understand the reasons for their counsel to accepting a Church calling when we are 
too busy to take on any more duties. My experience has taught me always to give the Lord and 
His Church the benefit of any doubts I may have when such a case seems too close to call.
 The willingness to be believing and accepting in these cases is not the same as blind obedi-
ence. Don’t confuse the two—a good lawyer can see the difference. You can develop a loving 
and knowing kind of obedience that is not blind at all. G. K. Chesterton once distinguished 
between “optimists,” “pessimists,” and “improvers,” which roughly corresponds to our three 
levels of dealing with ambiguity. He concluded that both the optimists and the pessimists 
look too much at only one side of things—that’s level one and level two. Neither the extreme 
a rt c r e di t s
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there are both a kindly light and a gloomy fog; or, even if they see both, they don’t see the 
difference between the light and the gloom. At level two, the difference is acutely apparent, 
but one’s acceptance of the ambiguity might be so pessimistic as to say, “Remember that the 
hour is darkest just before everything goes totally black.” Some people just focus on the light, 
others on the darkness. We need to see both and keep moving. “Lead, kindly Light, amid 
th’encircling gloom; Lead thou me on!”
 Consider one final illustration from a lawyer who understood levels two and three. His 
eyes were fully open to the reality, including the pain, of seeing things for what they were. Yet 
he had moved beyond that to a third level where his mature perspective permitted him to sub-
ordinate what he saw with those wide-open eyes to what he felt in his wide-open heart.
 This lawyer was my father. He was in his mid-50s and had a busy professional life with 
heavy obligations that often took him out of town for several days at a time. He was tired. At 
an earlier time in his life he had served for 10 years in a stake presidency.
 His good friend was called to be the bishop of their ward. He said he couldn’t accept the 
assignment unless my father would serve as his first counselor. Well, it’s one thing to be called 
as a bishop’s counselor when one is young and full of enthusiasm and one’s time is not heavily 
committed. One might understandably have a different attitude at a later, busier time in life. 
Here are my father’s inner thoughts as he wrote them that day in his journal:
 My first reaction was, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me. . . . I know something of the work 
required of a bishopric; it is a constant, continual grind. . . . I am busy and my [personal] affairs demand 
what spare time and energy I have. In some respects I am not humble and prayerful enough; I have not 
always been willing to submit unquestioningly to all the decisions of the Church . . . but neither do I feel that I 
can say no to any call that is made by the Church, and so now I add to my first reaction, “Nevertheless, not 
as I will, but as Thou wilt.”
 I will resolve to do it as best I can. There will be times when I will chafe under the endless meetings, but 
I am going to get completely in tune with the [Church] program. I do not intend to get sanctimonious, but 
there must be no reservations in my heart about my duties. It will not be hard for me to pay my tithing and 
attend regularly, as I have been doing that. But I will have to learn, I suppose, to love the Deseret News, 
or at least the Church Section, as much as I love the Tribune. . . . I will have to get to the temple more often. 
. . . I will have to become better acquainted with the ward members and be genuinely interested in them and 
their problems. . . . I will have to learn to love every one of them and to dispose myself in such a way that they 
might find it possible to feel the same toward me. Perhaps in my weak way I will have to try and live as close 
to the Lord as we expect the General Authorities to do.
 My father was an honest man who chose to have a believing heart. His approach makes me 
want to deal directly, but humbly, with life’s ambiguities. I want to be as childlike as my educa-
tion has taught me to be tough-minded, able to help solve a problem rather than just describe it.
 May we be honest and courageous enough to face squarely the uncertainties we encoun-
ter, try to understand them, and then do something about them. Perhaps then we will not be 
living on borrowed light. “Love is not blind; that is the last thing that it is. Love is bound; and 
the more it is bound the less it is blind.”
optimists nor the extreme pessimists would 
ever be of much help in improving human 
conditions, because people can’t solve prob-
lems unless they are willing to acknowledge 
that a problem exists while also remaining 
loyal enough to do something about it.
 Chesterton said the evil of the excessive 
optimist (level one) is that he
will defend the indefensible. He is the jingo of the 
universe; he will say, “My cosmos, right or wrong.” 
He will be less inclined to the reform of things; more 
inclined to a sort of front-bench official answer to all 
attacks, soothing every one with assurances. He will 
not wash the world, but whitewash the world. [G. K. 
Chesterton, Orthodoxy (New York: Cosimo, 
Inc., 2007), 62]
 On the other hand, the evil of the pessi-
mist (level two) is “not that he chastises gods 
and men, but that he does not love what he 
chastises.” In being the so-called “candid 
friend,” the pessimist is not really candid. 
Chesterton continued:
He is keeping something back—his own gloomy 
pleasure in saying unpleasant things. He has a secret 
desire to hurt, not merely to help. . . .
 . . . He is using that ugly knowledge which was 
allowed him [in order] to strengthen the army, to 
discourage people from joining it. [Id., 61]
 In going on to describe the “improvers” 
(level three—from optimists to pessimists to 
improvers), Chesterton talked about women 
who are so loyal to those who need them:
Some stupid people started the idea that because 
women obviously back up their own people through 
everything, therefore women are blind and do not 
see anything. They can hardly have known any 
women. The same women who are ready to defend 
their men through thick and thin are . . . almost 
morbidly lucid about the thinness of his excuses or 
the thickness of his head. . . . Love is not blind; that 
is the last thing that it is. Love is bound; and the 
more it is bound the less it is blind. [Id., 63]
 Chesterton’s arranging of these categories 
makes me think of one other way to compare 
the differing perspectives people bring to 
the way they cope with ambiguity. Consider 
the image of “lead, kindly Light,” an image 
about light in a gathering storm. At level 
one, people either do not or cannot see that 
at level one, people either do not  
or cannot see that there are both a kindly  
light and a gloomy fog; or, even if  
they see both, they don’t see the difference  
between the light and the gloom.
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While nothing can force or create a separa-
tion between us and the love of God, we 
need to remember that we can separate our-
selves from that love by our own choices 
and our own actions resulting from these 
choices.
 Does our devotion to God ever interfere 
with our sought-for success in our careers? 
Absolutely. We have both time and financial 
commitments to our Church with which 
others do not have to contend. We have 
family commitments that many of our col-
leagues find to be inconsistent with success. 
We have standards that we abide by that 
sometimes make us the focus of derision or 
disdain. We deal with people who are igno-
rantly intolerant of our religion who judge 
us in the context of their preconceived (and 
most often ill-conceived) notion of what our 
religion means or is. Our religion is not a pas-
sive religion. Rather, it requires daily sacrifice 
of time, of money, of missed business oppor-
tunities, and sometimes even a sacrifice of 
worldly acclaim. “Serve God” has to be the 
first foundation of any success.
l o v e  m e
 Benedick’s second admonition is “love 
me.” He is talking to Beatrice as his future 
wife, and his advice really is a reminder to 
focus our efforts on loving our families. As 
with the admonition to serve God, we can-
not find true success in our lives without 
being devoted to our families. And to go a 
step further, we cannot truly be devoted to 
our families without making sacrifices in 
our careers on their behalf. In fact, I would 
venture to say that if you have not made any 
sacrifices in your career for your family, you 
should question whether you really value 
your family above your career.
 With five children, decisions made by 
and for our family did not always meet with 
universal approval by each of the children. 
When these situations arose, I would always 
remind the unhappy child or children that 
we were a family and that as a family we had 
to sacrifice for each other. While a particular 
decision might be for the benefit of only one 
family member—requiring the rest of the 
family to sacrifice for that family member—
each of us knew in turn that when our time 
of need came, the family would sacrifice for 
us as well.
 If then God so clothe the grass, which is to day 
in the field, and to morrow is cast into the oven; how 
much more will he clothe you, O ye of little faith?
 And seek not ye what ye shall eat, or what ye 
shall drink, neither be ye of doubtful mind.   
 For all these things do the nations of the world 
seek after: and your Father knoweth that ye have 
need of these things.
 But rather seek ye the kingdom of God; and all 
these things shall be added unto you. . . .
 For where your treasure is, there will your 
heart be also.2
 In this passage Jesus reminds us that 
the secular things in our careers—earning 
money for food, drink, and fancy clothes—
are all things that “the nations of the world 
seek after.” Thus, when we focus pri-
marily on this goal, we are like every-
one else. What should distinguish us 
as followers of Christ is the focus of 
our minds, our hearts, and our souls 
on the kingdom of God. This seems 
like a pretty obvious component of 
success, but its obvious nature does 
not prevent the enticements of the 
trappings of material and worldly suc-
cess from diverting many from a focus 
on serving God.
 Does this scripture literally mean 
that we should not worry about how 
to feed and clothe ourselves and our 
families? I don’t think so. I think it is a 
lesson in priorities. If we serve God, if 
we seek the kingdom of God first, we 
will find personal success, whether or 
not it is success that is defined as such 
in the world. Success without serving 
God can never be true success because we 
can never be successful when we act coun-
ter to our inherent nature. We are children 
of our Heavenly Father, and if we are not 
serving Him, we are not acting consistently 
with our divine heritage. The Apostle Paul 
asks: “Who shall separate us from the love of 
Christ? shall tribulation, or distress, or perse-
cution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or 
sword?”3 He answers:
 For I am persuaded, that neither death, nor 
life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor 
things present, nor things to come,
 Nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, 
shall be able to separate us from the love of God, 
which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.4
the encapsulation of what I have learned in 
my life and my career.
 You may recall that Much Ado About 
Nothing is a comedy with two main charac-
ters, Benedick and Beatrice, each being the 
witty representative of their gender in casti-
gating the opposite gender. As Shakespeare 
has their friends play on their egos and their 
inherent good natures (despite their prickly 
exteriors), these two people, who swore 
never to engage in the folly of love, develop 
and demonstrate a truly caring relation-
ship with each other. As the play develops, 
Beatrice’s cousin Hero is maligned by the 
evil character Don John, and, choosing to 
believe the slander, Hero’s fiancé, Claudio, 
abandons and humiliates her at the marriage 
altar. Beatrice is devastated by this 
injury to her beloved cousin, and thus 
when Benedick comes to confess fully 
his love for her and asks her how he 
can demonstrate this love, she orders 
him to kill Claudio, Benedick’s best 
friend. When Benedick cannot talk 
Beatrice out of what to him seems an 
unreasonable demand, he reluctantly 
agrees to challenge Claudio to a duel. 
Benedick returns after making the 
challenge to report to Beatrice that 
he has done her bidding, and, after 
some witty repartee, the two have a 
serious moment. Benedick asks how 
her cousin fares. Beatrice reports that 
her cousin is very ill. He then asks 
Beatrice how she herself fares, and 
she reports that she is also very ill. He 
responds, in an uncharacteristic show 
of serious tenderness: “Serve God, 
love me, and mend.”1 I would suggest that 
this advice, seriously and lovingly given, is 
a template for success in our profession or, 
better said, a template for how to assess suc-
cess in our lives.
s e r v e  g o d
 The first advice Benedick gives is to 
“serve God.” This statement is reminis-
cent of the admonition found in the New 
Testament:
 Consider the lilies how they grow: they toil 
not, they spin not; and yet I say unto you, that 
Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of 
these.
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 In an oft-quoted statement among law-
yers, Joseph Story said: “[The law] is a jealous 
mistress, and requires a long and constant 
courtship. It is not to be won by trifling 
favors, but by lavish homage.”5 Anyone who 
has practiced law understands this analogy 
and the enticements of the 24/7 approach 
modern attorneys take to the practice.
 How do we cope with this disparity 
between the realities of modern law practice 
and our need to devote time to our families? 
When we compare ourselves and our suc-
cesses with others, we will always be disap-
pointed. As I used to say to my children, just 
remember that no matter how smart you are, 
there will always be somebody smarter. We 
need to find satisfaction in doing the best 
we can in the sphere in which we find our-
selves, large or small. We should not fall into 
the trap of competing with those who have 
accepted the law as their jealous (and only) 
mistress.
 We also need to redefine the meaning 
of success. My father, now in his 80s, is an 
electrical engineer who had a very success-
ful career and is a well-recognized inventor. 
He recently said to me that when you get to 
his age you realize that it is only family that 
matters. No matter how successful we are 
in our careers, it is only a fleeting aspect of 
 There were many times in my career 
when my choices made to meet the needs 
of my family came at the expected price of 
a failed or curtailed career. I worked part-
time for many years at a time when this was 
highly unusual and with the attendant 
stigma that came (and sometimes still 
comes) with this choice that I was 
not truly devoted to my career or 
somehow was not keeping up with 
my peers. When I was invited by 
my firm to work in a home office, 
I agreed to do so to finish paying 
off my husband’s medical school 
debt, but I had no expectation that 
my career would go anywhere. I 
mean, in a time before e-mail and the 
Internet, with four children at home, 
including a new baby, how could I pos-
sibly succeed in my career? I anticipated 
that this family-driven choice sounded the 
death knell of my career. It was surprising 
for me to discover that my mostly New York 
clients did not care about my unorthodox 
working arrangements. They only cared 
about whether they were being represented 
and advised well.
 Because of my choice to work part-time 
and then in a home office, I also watched 
my male contemporaries pass me by with 
higher pay, wider acclaim, and better work 
opportunities. It was at times very painful 
to realize that, from a career advancement 
perspective, I was being left behind in my 
profession, and I was not sure I would ever 
be able to catch up. Even after I moved into 
a more mainstream practice of my career, I 
still had to suffer enduring discrimination, 
particularly on the issue of unequal (mean-
ing lesser) pay for women. A female col-
league recently sent me an article on a new 
study conducted by professors at Temple 
University and the University of Texas–Pan 
American concluding that women attorneys 
are still paid significantly less than their male 
counterparts and that such disparity is not 
performance based—women lawyers being 
found to be just as productive as men. I did 
not need to read a study to conclude this. I 
lived this. I was not able to control this part 
of my career until recently, so I focused 
instead on building in the flexibility I needed 
to meet my family needs, on developing the 
skills I needed to be a good lawyer, and on 
feeling good about that.
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kill Claudio, the perceived source of the injus-
tice. When Benedick is unable to talk her out of 
this demand for retributive justice, he returns, 
having made the challenge, but advises her 
that rather than seeking revenge, she should 
focus her efforts internally to mend.
 My husband is a doctor, and when 
our oldest son was very young, he 
once explained, in response to a 
question as to what his parents did: 
“My dad helps sick people. My 
mom works for money.” I think 
this assessment is not far off from 
the public perception of what we 
do as lawyers. In reality our jobs 
are not much different than doc-
tors. As lawyers, we are, or should 
be, problem solvers. We are there 
to heal, or mend, the problems of 
others. We are entrusted with resolv-
ing the injustices suffered by our cli-
ents. Sometimes those injustices are at the 
hands of other parties. Sometimes, as in my 
area of the law—bankruptcy—the source of 
the harm is less focused, but its impact can 
be widespread. It can be an unattributed 
injustice, being a by-product of a distressed 
economy or a changing industry or business 
environment or honest management mis-
takes; but it is a problem that we, as lawyers, 
are uniquely qualified to solve.
 Similar to the reaction of Beatrice, our 
society has become so litigious that when 
any injustice is suffered, the first response is 
to sue. Sometimes this is the best response, 
but a good lawyer will understand the 
options and will help a client to mend, to 
figure out a solution that will focus on and 
then remedy the real problem, not just the 
emotionally perceived one. When I started 
practicing business bankruptcy law, I 
thought that at least this was not a practice 
that had an emotional component. It was 
not like divorce law, for example. This was 
a mistaken perception. I quickly learned that 
people are very emotional about money. In 
addition, my area of the law deals with peo-
ple’s jobs, their abilities to support their fam-
ilies, their investments in their businesses, 
honestly made mistakes with serious conse-
quences, and sometimes betrayal by dishon-
est or downright fraudulent behavior. I now 
understand that every area of the law has an 
emotional component. Like Benedick coun-
seled Beatrice, we as lawyers need to help 
this life. You may be king of the hill in your 
profession today, but there will always be 
others charging up the hill to take your place. 
Remember, however, that you will never be 
replaced as the mother or father or sister or 
brother or daughter or son in your family.
 In a well-known passage from the Book 
of Mormon, Alma starts with the wish “O 
that I were an angel”6 and ends up with the 
hope that if he can be an “instrument in the 
hands of God to bring some soul to repen-
tance,”7 he will feel successful. Alma pro-
gresses from a grandiose wish to a feeling 
of contentment in whatever small sphere he 
finds himself with the hope for the opportu-
nity to change even one life. This is a great 
pattern for redefining success.
 “Love me” reminds us that you must love 
and sacrifice for your family as the second 
foundation of real success.
m e n d
 The third piece of advice Benedick gives 
is to mend. Beatrice and her cousin have suf-
fered a great injustice, and they both are made 
unwell by the wrong done them. Beatrice’s 
response to this injustice is to ask Benedick to 
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discriminated against, and none of the large 
firms would hire them. Bankruptcy law at 
that time was not a mainstream practice 
for large firms. It was looked down on, so 
it was an area open for these excluded Jews 
to fill in with their own small boutique firms. 
I found it interesting that the area of practice 
I eventually specialized in—which was not 
what I intended to choose in law school—has 
historically been a haven for the excluded in 
the profession. Somehow, as a discriminated 
minority myself, I find it fitting to eventually 
have been welcomed by this same specialty.
 Harper Lee once wrote: “People who have 
made peace with themselves are the people I 
most admire in the world.”11 I agree. Perhaps, 
in the end, that is why we admire her literary 
creation, Atticus Finch, so much, because 
Harper Lee created a lawyer she admired, a 
lawyer who was not perfect but who was a 
person who had made peace with himself. If 
we are to belong in this profession, we also 
need to make peace with ourselves. I would 
suggest that we can do this through serv-
ing God, loving our families, and mending 
the wrongs suffered by our clients. In focus-
ing our efforts on others, in losing ourselves 
in serving others, we can be at peace with 
ourselves. By focusing our education, our 
abilities, and our opportunities on others, we 
can, in some small way, change this difficult 
profession into something a bit better. “Serve 
God, love me, and mend.” With your legal 
education, you have a wonderful opportunity 
to make a difference in the world. Do it.
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a profession at a time when there were very 
few practicing women lawyers, I struggled 
as a minority to find my way and to belong 
in this profession. What I discovered in my 
quest—something I did not even realize 
until I was there—was that when we talk 
about belonging, we need to change our 
focus. We need to stop focusing on ourselves 
and start focusing on others. When we focus 
on others, then we can belong, no matter 
how different we feel and are. Long before 
I even understood the foundations of my 
success in this profession, this is what I was 
inadvertently learning.
 None of us are ever entirely respon-
sible for success in our careers. None of us 
are self-made men or women, as is so well 
articulated in the oft-quoted phrase of John 
Donne: “No man is an island.”10 Each of us 
stands on the shoulders of others. Sometimes 
those supporting shoulders come from unex-
pected places. For me, it was, surprisingly, 
the intercession and support of some of the 
New York partners in my firm during criti-
cal years. One of these partners, who started 
working with me while I was working part-
time in a home office, initially required that 
I check in with him every single day, as he 
was concerned about whether I could ade-
quately handle a difficult case for one of his 
very important clients. After he had watched 
me in action, he became one of my greatest 
advocates. While, during that period, I saw 
limited prospects for my career as a home 
office lawyer in the late ’80s, he and other of 
my New York partners looked beyond my 
unconventional trappings and saw a talented 
problem solver for whom they provided 
work opportunities and political support 
within the firm. Remembering the kindness 
of these partners to me, I have tried to emu-
late them when I am now asked for favors to 
help others in their careers. Success brings 
more ability to help others, and that is the 
obligation of those who succeed.
 Last week, at a meeting of the American 
College of Bankruptcy, I heard a report 
on a historical project done by the college 
wherein bankruptcy practitioners from the 
1930s and 1940s (all men, of course) were 
interviewed. During this time period, virtu-
ally all bankruptcy practitioners nationwide 
were Jews. As was explained by these men, 
that was because other areas of practice 
were not open to Jews. They were openly 
our clients work through emotionally charged 
situations and mend.
 One of the things I love about prac-
ticing bankruptcy law is that, most of the 
time, bankruptcy lawyers know when to 
quit fighting. We litigate to bring about 
a business solution, understanding that 
with scarce resources and money, creative 
approaches are warranted. We understand 
that we are not just lawyers but counselors. 
As with all lawyers, our job is often to sac-
rifice our own inclinations in order to serve 
our clients. At times that may mean keep-
ing an even temperament in an abusive or 
heated situation. It may mean that we settle 
a case that we feel certain we could win. 
It may mean that we submerge our ego or 
emotional investment in a course of action 
to accept a better solution for a client’s busi-
ness needs. It may mean that we forego 
higher fees we could earn if the client were 
to choose a certain legal remedy because 
another legal remedy is a better fit for the 
client. Our job is to help our clients mend, 
to fully understand their problems, and to 
address them with caring and competence.
 What I have found to be most important 
to clients who end up seeking to redress their 
injustices in the courts is simply to know that 
they have been heard, that they have been lis-
tened to and understood, and to feel that they 
have been fairly judged. It is our job to make 
sure this happens by being competent lawyers 
and helping clients, whether big or small, to 
mend. Harper Lee said it best, through the 
voice of her literary creation, Atticus Finch, 
when he said in his closing argument: 
There is one way in this country in which all men 
are created equal. . . . That institution . . . is a court. 
. . . Our courts have their faults, as does any human 
institution, but in this country our courts are the great 
levelers, and in our courts all men are created equal.8 
We, as lawyers, provide access to this great 
societal equalizer. Serving our clients, or 
mending their injuries, should be the third 
foundation of success.
 All three foundations of success I have 
mentioned are bound together by a com-
mon focus on others. This shared theme 
takes us back to the admonition in the scrip-
tures: “For whosoever will save his life shall 
lose it: and whosoever will lose his life for 
my sake shall find it.”9 As a woman entering 
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they also play a role in foreign relations.15 
Indeed, they are primarily instruments of 
foreign affairs and secondarily domestic law. 
A treaty cannot exist without consent from 
a foreign sovereign. The inclusion of treaties 
in Article II, rather than Article I, highlights 
the international nature of treaties. Article 
II addresses executive power and does not 
speak expressly of legislative authority.16 
The dual view of treaties has also been con-
firmed by the Supreme Court as recently as 
Medellín.17 Treaties’ dual nature as instru-
ments of foreign affairs and domestic law 
produces a variety of differences between 
statutes and treaties. For example, trea-
ties often use broad terminology to extract 
consent from global diversity.18 This termi-
nology and the concepts it reflects may not 
readily cohere with u.s. law, the operation of 
the u.s. legal system, or typical u.s. terminol-
ogy, “even when the policies of the treat[y] 
are otherwise [consistent] with u.s. law.”19 
These differences, the argument goes, jus-
tify differential treatment and, in particular, 
less judicial enforcement of treaties than is 
afforded statutes.20
II An Expanded Duality
The dual nature of treaties, upon which 
this final argument relies, has been widely 
acknowledged and is not particularly con-
troversial.21 The controversy results from 
reliance on treaty duality to undercut the 
equivalence thesis and support non-self- 
execution.22
 This article accommodates concern for 
the exclusive reliance on treaty duality, at 
least partially, by taking treaty duality only 
as a starting point. The article goes further 
to introduce, and build on, the duality of 
the Constitution and statutes. Given the 
inordinate focus on treaty duality, the dual 
nature of the Constitution and statutes has 
been overlooked in the self-execution debate. 
Treaties are not the only source of law that 
affects international affairs.
 Statutes affect foreign relations in many 
ways. At one extreme, statutes applied within 
u.s. territory can have foreign relations 
impact even when applied to u.s. nationals. 
Statutes of this type might include the federal 
death penalty, which generates opposition 
from abolitionist countries.23 Other statutes 
have an even more direct impact: namely, 
may create something less than preemp-
tive, judicially enforceable federal law.8 For 
example, statutes may “expressly eschew pre-
emption of state law, . . . authorize states to 
opt out of federal requirements, . . . and . . . 
not impose binding obligations.”9 Similarly, 
those with authority to enact constitutional 
law have crafted constitutional provisions 
with limited reach. Initially, the Constitution 
was amended to add “a Bill of Rights appli-
cable only to the federal government.”10
 Second, scholars have argued based 
on constitutional text, history, purpose, 
and precedent that the Constitution does 
not require equivalence. They note, for 
example, that the Supremacy Clause fails 
to address the relation of all three sources 
of federal law.11 Thus, the Constitution is 
superior to laws and treaties notwithstand-
ing the fact that the Supremacy Clause 
lumps all three sources together. Just as 
there is no sense that the Supremacy Clause 
limits the Constitution’s superior status as 
the source of lawmaking and treatymaking 
authority, there is no reason to believe that 
the Supremacy Clause precludes authority 
to enter treaties that attempt less than the 
Supremacy Clause allows.12 The Supremacy 
Clause explicitly binds state judges to the 
Constitution, laws, and treaties in the face 
of inconsistent state constitutional and 
statutory law.13 This provision requires 
judges to follow the dictates of the federal 
Constitution, treaties, and laws, but it does 
not say that these sources must dictate pre-
emption of state law.
 The Supremacy Clause’s purpose also 
indicates that treaties need not receive equiv-
alent treatment. The Constitution and stat-
utes were included in the Supremacy Clause 
to secure the domestic lawmaking suprem-
acy of the federal government in areas of del-
egated authority. Treaties, by contrast, were 
not included to secure another avenue of 
supreme domestic lawmaking but to secure 
federal foreign affairs supremacy in response 
to a history of state treaty violations.14 To 
the extent that non-self-execution turns, for 
example, on treatymaker intent, it appears 
consistent with the purpose behind inclu-
sion in a way that similar treatment of the 
Constitution and statutes might not.
 Third, scholars argue that treaties’ 
dual nature justifies differential treatment. 
Treaties not only function as domestic law, 
1829, in the landmark case of Foster v. Neilson, 
that only self-executing treaties immediately 
provide rules of decision.3 The majority of 
foreign relations scholars oppose expansive 
classification of treaties as non-self-executing. 
That opposition has recently trained on 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín v. 
Texas,4 and understandably so, as Medellín 
arguably eclipsed Foster as the Court’s most 
important pronouncement on the domes- 
tic status of treaties and endorsed a broad 
notion of non-self-execution.5
 One of the ways in which scholars chal-
lenge non-self-execution is by asserting that 
it violates a constitutional principle of equiv-
alence.6 As discussed below, various argu-
ments countering the equivalence thesis have 
been offered to date. I offer a new response. 
This response turns on the recognition that 
all three sources of supreme federal law have 
a dual nature. Treaties are primarily interna-
tional agreements and secondarily domes-
tic law. The Constitution and statutes, by 
contrast, primarily function as domestic 
law but also play a role in international rela-
tions, particularly when they apply extrater-
ritorially. Comparing judicial treatment of 
all three sources along their secondary axis 
reveals that treaties receive not just equiva-
lent treatment but better treatment than at 
least statutes even under a broad notion of 
non-self-execution. This novel comparison 
thus lends support to the doctrine of non-
self-execution.
I  The Equivalence Thesis and   
 Counterarguments
As noted, some scholars have opposed 
broad classification of treaties as non-self-
executing on the grounds that it violates 
a constitutional requirement of equivalent 
treatment. The Supremacy Clause designates 
the Constitution, statutes, and treaties as 
supreme federal law.7 In doing so, the argu-
ment goes, the Supremacy Clause requires 
equivalent treatment of all three sources.
 Defenders of non-self-execution have 
responded, in effect, with three principal 
arguments. First, scholars have argued that 
non-self-execution does not result in dif-
ferential treatment. Just as treatymakers 
may create something less than a judicially 
enforceable treaty, those authorized to 
amend the Constitution or to make statutes 
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Constitution, statutes, and treaties in their 
areas of secondary application is a matter of 
domestic law.40
IV Treatment of the Constitution,   
 Statutes, and Treaties in Their Areas  
 of Secondary Application
The comparison is also timely as the 
Supreme Court has recently issued relevant 
opinions for each source of law. The Court’s 
most recent foray into the extraterritorial41 
application of the Constitution occurred 
in Boumediene v. Bush,42 in which the Court 
concluded that aliens detained as enemy 
combatants at Guantánamo Bay “have the 
constitutional privilege of habeas corpus, 
a privilege not to be withdrawn except in 
conformance with the Suspension Clause.”43 
In Medellín v. Texas, the Supreme Court 
handed down its most important decision 
on the domestic status of treaties in roughly 
200 years, and perhaps ever.44 The Medellín 
Court assessed whether u.s. treaty commit-
ments in relation to the International Court 
of Justice (icj) were self-executing, render-
ing icj judgments preemptive, judicially 
enforceable federal law.45 Endorsing a broad 
notion of non-self-execution,46 the Court 
concluded that the relevant treaty obliga-
tions were not self-executing.47 And, while 
there has long been uncertainty regarding 
how to ascertain the extraterritorial reach of 
statutes, with divergent views in the litera-
ture and even in Court precedent, two rela-
tively recent cases arguably provide a general 
framework: Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. 
California48 and F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. 
v. Empagran s.a.,49 both of which addressed 
application of u.s. antitrust law beyond u.s. 
borders.
 A comparison of the judicial treat-
ment afforded the Constitution, statutes, 
and treaties in their area of secondary 
application in Boumediene, Hartford Fire, 
III A New Comparative Axis
Given the dual nature of the Constitution, 
statutes, and treaties, domestic judicial 
treatment of these sources might be com-
pared along several axes. Critics of non-self-
execution compare the judicial treatment of 
these sources in their domestic roles.35 This 
assessment involves either comparing two 
things (constitutional and statutory law) 
that do not possess a dual nature (if one is 
unpersuaded by the prior section) with one 
(treaty law) that does, or comparing three 
things that have a dual nature but com-
paring the treatment of two sources (the 
Constitution and statutes) in their primary 
function and a third (the treaty) in its sec-
ondary function.
 The latter approach is better than com-
paring the treatment of all three sources 
in their foreign affairs applications. In the 
foreign affairs arena, the relevance of con-
stitutional limits and statutes is governed 
by domestic law. While international law 
certainly addresses states’ authority to act in 
certain ways and, in particular, to apply their 
law outside their borders,36 neither Congress 
in enacting statutes37 nor the Constitution38 
is confined in u.s. courts by the dictates of 
international law. Thus, domestic law con-
trols the extraterritorial roles of statutes 
and constitutional constraints. By contrast, 
the United States recognizes that treaties, 
at least in their extraterritorial legal dimen-
sion, are governed by international law, 
which defines such things as what quali-
fies as a treaty, how treaties are formed and 
terminated, and rights upon breach.39 The 
comparison of the Constitution, statutes, 
and treaties in their foreign affairs roles thus 
mixes bodies of law.
 Comparing judicial treatment of the 
Constitution, statutes, and treaties in 
their areas of secondary application avoids 
this problem. The legal treatment of the 
statutes that specifically target foreign nation-
als—such as immigration laws24—or that 
authorize or command foreign actions by 
u.s. officials.25 Arguably, statutes that regu-
late not only actions at home but actions 
abroad, especially the acts of foreign nation-
als, are prototypical of statutes’ secondary, 
foreign affairs role.26 Such statutes are not 
uncommon; the United States has regulated 
foreign activity through inter alia, antitrust, 
securities, copyright, trademark, intellectual 
property, bankruptcy, tax, corporate, crimi-
nal, labor, civil rights, and environmental 
law.27 The extraterritorial expansion of u.s. 
law has, unsurprisingly, been met with oppo-
sition from foreign states.28
 With regard to the Constitution, a simi-
lar spectrum exists. Constitutional limita-
tions on domestic regulation of domestic 
conduct, such as limitations on regulation 
of hate speech, can produce foreign rela-
tions issues. In ratifying the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for 
example, the United States entered a res-
ervation, refusing to assume an obligation 
to prohibit “advocacy of national, racial or 
religious hatred that constitutes incitement 
to discrimination, hostility or violence”29 
insofar as such a prohibition would con-
travene constitutional (and statutory) free 
speech protections.30 The scope of govern-
ment actors’ constitutional authority both 
to make decisions related to foreign affairs31 
and to take actions outside u.s. territory32 
also bears heavily on foreign relations. The 
scope of constitutional protections avail-
able to aliens likewise affects our relations 
with others.33 Numerous foreign and inter-
national officials, for instance, filed amicus 
briefs in support of the Guantánamo detain-
ees in Boumediene v. Bush.34 Indeed, at the 
heart of the Constitution’s secondary role 
seems to lie the question whether constitu-
tional limits constrain federal conduct out-
side u.s. territory.
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in identifying the domestic effect of treaties. 
The Medellín Court relied, in small part, on 
express evidence of the treatymakers’ intent 
regarding self-execution.58 This reliance may 
have resulted from the availability of evi-
dence directly on point, in which case the 
difference between Medellín and Boumediene 
may not be in their commitment to intent, 
but rather in the scope of evidence available 
to identify intent.
 However, Medellín attempted to tether 
its analysis to intent—even when invok-
ing functional considerations—in a way 
that Boumediene did not. Like Boumediene, 
Medellín focused on functional consider-
ations, such as the practical consequences of 
treating icj judgments as judicially unassail-
able federal law.59 In Medellín, however, the 
functional considerations mix with, rather 
than arise separate from, consideration of 
the treatymakers’ intent.60 Perhaps this 
was because the functional considerations 
led to a conclusion consistent with the evi-
dence of the treatymakers’ intent. But the 
Court seems to treat both evidence of the 
Executive’s and Senate’s understanding dur-
ing the advice and consent process and the 
functional considerations as evidence of 
actual intent. Indeed, in the final sentence 
of its self-execution analysis, the Court 
states: “Nothing in the text, background, 
negotiating and drafting history, or practice 
among signatory nations suggests that the 
President or Senate intended the improb-
able result of giving the judgments of an 
international tribunal a higher status than 
that enjoyed by ‘many of our most funda-
mental constitutional protections.’”61
 In light of the coupling of evidence of 
actual intent with functional considerations, 
the intent identified is arguably more con-
structive than actual. As a result, the attempt 
to tie functional considerations to intent 
may be little different than the Boumediene 
Court’s shunting of original intent. Yet the 
dence of original intent.53 Its discussion 
of precedents that engaged in functional 
analyses suggests that the functional test 
may be the primary means for determining 
constitutional reach rather than a secondary 
approach to be taken only in the face of an 
indiscernible original intent.
 Unbound by original intent, the func-
tional analysis gives the Court significant 
discretion to determine the reach of consti-
tutional limitations.54 In (at least recent) his-
torical context where the judiciary generally 
has given the Constitution limited extrater-
ritorial scope, the discretion tends to expand 
the Constitution’s foreign role.55 Relatedly, 
the discretion ensures a prominent role for 
the judiciary in fixing the Constitution’s 
reach. The Boumediene Court made that fact 
explicit in rejecting the government’s formal-
ist approach to the reach of habeas partially 
on separation of powers grounds, arguing 
that the government’s formal, de jure sov-
ereignty limitation on habeas would allow 
the President and Congress “to switch the 
Constitution on or off at will” in “a strik-
ing anomaly in our tripartite system of 
government.”56 Likewise, while the Court 
recognized the need for deference to the 
Executive with regard to the procedural and 
substantive standards governing detention 
of possible terrorists, the Court emphasized 
the need for judicial review of detention as 
well.57
 Boumediene thus introduces a signifi-
cant level of judicial discretion into the 
Constitution’s foreign affairs role. The 
political branches do not control the 
Constitution’s extraterritorial reach by stat-
ute or treaty. The Court fixes that reach and 
does so in light of functional considerations 
that elide the restraints of more categorical 
approaches based on such things as formal 
sovereignty.
 2. Judicial Treatment of Treaties. The intent 
of the lawmakers appears to play a larger role 
Hoffmann-La Roche, and Medellín reveals 
that statutes fare the worst. While the 
intent of the relevant lawmakers surfaces 
in the treatment of each source, the analy-
sis of intent, and particularly the relation 
of intent to functional considerations, dif-
fers with each, leading to differing levels of 
judicial discretion to enforce the law in its 
area of secondary application. 
 1. Judicial Treatment of the Constitution. In 
Boumediene, the Court attempted to iden-
tify the original intent behind constitutional 
habeas; only when that attempt failed did 
the Court conduct its functional analysis. 
On these facts, one might conclude that the 
Court assigns a dominant role to original 
intent in constitutional extraterritoriality. 
That role, however, may be more formal 
than real.
 The majority could have grounded its 
decision in original intent, perhaps supple-
mented by functional considerations.50 The 
majority’s conclusion that the evidence 
of original intent was indefinite may have 
been sincere, but it may also have been an 
attempt to shunt the confines of original 
intent to allow the Court to reach its own 
conclusion on the scope of constitutional 
habeas informed by a multifactored, func-
tional analysis. Even in the face of originalist 
uncertainty, the Court made statements to 
suggest that it would not always be bound 
by original intent. The Court characterized 
legal commentary and settled precedent 
from 1789 as potentially “instructive” in its 
analysis.51 Relatedly, the Court left open the 
possibility (as it had before) that the scope 
of constitutional habeas has expanded since 
ratification, rendering precedents from 1789 
the beginning point of analysis.52 Moreover, 
when the Court turned to its functional 
analysis it made no attempt to cast the 
analysis as an exercise in constructive intent. 
Nor did it attempt, in any significant way, 
to bolster its functional analysis with evi-
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the treatymakers would not expect the treaty 
to be self-executing, obviating—at least in 
some situations—the need for the contem-
plated international enforcement.80
 As noted, each of these considerations 
reflects a separation of powers in which 
the judiciary takes second seat in lawmak-
ing and foreign affairs. The considerations 
fall short of establishing a formal presump-
tion of non-self-execution.81 Together, 
however, they limit judicial opportunity 
to classify a treaty as self-executing and 
immediately enforceable as domestic law.82 
That result, though arguably inconsistent 
with Boumediene’s expansion of judicial 
authority, was not accidental. In respond-
ing to Justice Breyer’s proposed analysis, 
the Court emphasized the impropriety of 
expanding the judiciary’s foreign affairs 
and lawmaking power through self-
execution analysis.83
 3. Judicial Treatment of Statutes. 
Restrictions on judicial discre-
tion to classify treaties as self-
executing, however, are not as 
severe as those on the extraterri-
torial application of statutes. The 
ultimate determinant of statutory 
extraterritoriality is congressional intent. 
The Court recognizes, for example, that 
Congress can apply a statute beyond the 
boundaries imposed by international law.84 
At the same time, the Court enlists two 
canons of interpretation to fix statutes’ 
extraterritorial reach: the presumption 
against extraterritoriality, which assumes 
that Congress legislates only for u.s. terri-
tory, and the Charming Betsy canon, which 
seeks a statutory interpretation that is con-
sistent with international law.85
 Application of each canon can involve 
functional considerations. In United States 
v. Bowman, for example, the Court found 
the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity overcome given the nature of the activ-
ity Congress sought to prohibit—conduct 
easily and as likely committed abroad as 
at home—and the practical consequences 
of preventing the statute from reaching 
the extraterritorial conduct.86 Functional 
considerations inform application of the 
Charming Betsy canon as well. In determin-
ing whether a particular extraterritorial 
application is consistent with international 
law, courts should first identify one of five 
the practical consequences of doing so “give 
pause.”71 Treating commitments toward 
the icj as self-executing threatened the pos-
sibility of unassailable icj judgments that 
preempt state and federal law and void crimi-
nal convictions and sentences.72 The Court 
presumed that express election of such 
consequences should be left to the political 
branches,73 notwithstanding the fact that 
the political branches arguably chose those 
consequences in accepting the relevant treaty 
obligations.74
 Third, the Court should be sensitive 
to the effect of self-execution on political 
branch discretion and u.s. foreign rela-
tions.75 Justice Breyer’s dissenting, case-by-
case, multivariate approach to self-execution 
would label a treaty self-executing in some 
contexts and not in others based on a judicial 
determination and would hamper the United 
States’ ability to enter treaties with other 
countries.76 Branding the relevant treaty 
obligations self-executing would also remove 
the option of deciding whether and how to 
comply with icj judgments.77 Perhaps that 
result would not be troubling in certain cir-
cumstances. However, international law and 
the u.s. treatymakers contemplated the pos-
sibility of both noncompliance and u.s. veto 
of any Security Council attempts at enforce-
ment, and the judiciary, under Medellín’s 
separation of powers, should not limit that 
discretion.78
 Fourth and relatedly, the relevant treaties 
established international means of enforcing 
treaty obligations relative to the icj.79 The 
Court presumed in such circumstances that 
Medellín Court acknowledges some need to 
ground its decision in the authority of the 
lawmakers. Consequently, Medellín argu-
ably manifests at least a marginally greater 
commitment to lawmaker intent than does 
Boumediene. This commitment restrains the 
judiciary in classifying treaties as enforceable 
domestic law.
 The functional considerations that inform 
the self-execution analysis also constrain—
rather than expand, as in Boumediene—judi-
cial enforcement of treaties. The functional 
considerations in Medellín reflect a separa-
tion of powers vision in which the political 
branches take the lead in foreign affairs and 
lawmaking.62 To illustrate, suppose that 
a treaty imposed a broad obligation such 
as the duty to provide due pro-
cess. A court could certainly fill 
such an obligation with content 
as courts do in enforcing the 
Constitution.63 However, the 
Medellín Court presumed that 
if treaty obligations are not spe-
cifically defined, Congress did 
not intend judicial enforcement 
absent congressional implementation.64 The 
political branches generally should fill vague 
treaty obligations with content. The obliga-
tion to “undertake[ ] to comply with” icj 
judgments was such an obligation.65 It did 
not suggest an immediate obligation to judi-
cially enforce judgments but a range of steps 
that might be taken to implement icj deci-
sions.66 Under Medellín’s separation of pow-
ers perspective, the political branches should 
elect those steps. Although this line of think-
ing limits judicial enforcement of treaties, 
many critics of non-self-execution agree that 
treaty obligations may be non-self-executing 
if they are vague.67 The Court’s other separa-
tion of powers judgments are more contro-
versial.68
 First, the Court considered whether 
other parties to the relevant treaties made 
icj judgments immediately enforceable in 
their domestic courts.69 The absence of per-
suasive evidence that other states adopted 
this practice supported a finding of non-self-
execution on the implicit presumption that 
the political branches may, but the judiciary 
should not, assume unilateral obligations on 
behalf of the United States.70
 Second, the judiciary should be reluc-
tant to classify a treaty as self-executing if 
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hold, obstructing extraterritorial application 
of statutes.94 And in all cases, the presump-
tions will restrict judicial discretion in stat-
utes’ area of secondary application.95
 In short, the roles of lawmaker intent, 
functional considerations, and ultimately 
judicial discretion differ significantly in the 
Constitution’s, statutes’, and treaties’ areas 
of secondary application. In some cases, 
original intent might control the extrater-
ritorial reach of the Constitution. At least 
when original intent is indeterminate, 
however, a functional analysis ensues. The 
functional analysis provides the judiciary 
greater discretion to extend constitutional 
limitations in foreign relations. With trea-
ties, the analysis also focuses on intent, 
but functional considerations combine 
with evidence of actual intent to form a 
sort of hybrid intent. These separation 
of powers–inspired considerations tend 
toward non-self-execution, but do not 
erect a formal presumption against self-
execution. As a result, courts retain limited 
but still significant discretion to enforce 
treaties as domestic law. The functional 
considerations bearing on the extraterrito-
rial reach of statutes, by contrast, inform 
presumptions that Congress did not intend 
to regulate extraterritorially or in excess of 
international law. These presumptions limit 
judicial discretion to apply statutes extrater-
ritorially. The result is that the hurdles the 
Constitution and treaties face prior to judi-
cial enforcement in their secondary areas 
are flatter than the hurdles statutes must 
overcome before being applied extraterrito-
rially, notwithstanding the inclusion of all 
three sources in the Supremacy Clause. 
C O N C L U S I O N
Despite claims that a broad doctrine of non-
self-execution discriminates against treaties 
and thus violates a constitutional require-
ment of equivalent treatment, comparison 
of judicial treatment of the Constitution, 
statutes, and treaties in their areas of sec-
ondary application reveals that even a broad 
notion of non-self-execution does not dis-
criminate against treaties. The expanded 
duality and new comparative axis discussed 
above thus support a broader view of non-
self-execution than has been endorsed by 
most foreign relations law scholars.
grounds recognized in international law for 
exercising prescriptive jurisdiction.87 Some 
of these grounds parallel functional consid-
erations in Boumediene: whether the regu-
lated person or activity is within the state’s 
territory, whether the person regulated or 
harmed is a national of the regulating gov-
ernment, and whether regulation is neces-
sary to a state’s core interests, including 
security interests.88
 Functional considerations likewise guide 
the reasonableness analysis that ensues 
when a state has a basis to exercise prescrip-
tive jurisdiction but that exercise targets “a 
person or activity having connections with 
another state.”89 Reasonableness may turn 
on such things as whether there is a territo-
rial link between the action or actor regu-
lated and the regulating state, the effect of 
the regulation on justified expectations, “the 
extent to which another state may have an 
interest in regulating the activity,” and “the 
likelihood of conflict with regulation by 
another state.”90 These considerations focus 
on the effect of extraterritorial application 
of a statute on another sovereign’s author-
ity.91 Many of these factors track Boumediene’s 
consideration of such things as the link of the 
government activity regulated (i.e., appre-
hension and detention) to u.s. territory 
and the link between the detainees and the 
United States.
 The considerations in the statutory 
context, however, are critically different. 
In Boumediene, functional considerations 
supported judicial discretion to extend 
the Constitution’s protections extrater-
ritorially. In Medellín, functional consider-
ations informed treatymaker intent. In the 
statutory context, the Court has expressly 
rejected “excessive reliance on functional 
considerations and reconstructed congres-
sional intent” in fixing extraterritoriality.92 
Functional considerations in the statutory 
context are not permissive guidelines for 
the courts to decide “what Congress would 
have wanted.”93 Instead, functional consid-
erations inform whether the presumptions 
against extraterritoriality and violation of 
international law are overcome. These pre-
sumptions restrain both Congress and the 
courts from applying statutes extraterritori-
ally. As the Supreme Court has illustrated, 
most recently in Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank Ltd., the presumptions sometimes will 
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he first meeting of the West 
African Chapter of J. Reuben 
Clark Law Society was held in 
Nigeria in August 2010, bringing 
the total number of international 
chapters to 24 in 18 different 
countries. Elder Declan O. Madu, 
an Area Seventy from Owerri, in 
Imo State, was named chair of 
the new chapter with Ted Goh, 
from Accra, Ghana, as chair-elect. 
The meeting was attended by 
32 lawyers, students, General 
Authorities, and a justice of the 
Nigerian High Court.
 Elder Madu, Justice 
Ikpomwem, Nigerian government 
attorney Chijioke Okoro, and 
Elder Adesinna J. Olukanni of the 
Seventy spoke. J. Reuben Clark 
Law Society international chair 
Nancy Van Slooten joined the 
proceedings via Skype and also 
addressed the gathering. Later, at 
a fireside, Elder John B. Dickson of 
the Seventy, who is serving as the 
first counselor in the Africa West 
Area presidency, spoke.
 Van Slooten pointed out ben-
efits of membership in the Society 
to the West African community. 
She said that members there would 
reach out, mentor each other and 
younger attorneys, look for oppor-
tunities for pro bono service, and 
seek to be an influence for good. 
 Justice Ikpomwem set down 
expectations of the judiciary for 
lds attorneys. He said lds lawyers 
are expected to say no to all 
forms of injustice and, as stated in 
Amos 5:15, he or she must “hate 
the evil, and love the good” to 
help establish justice. 
 Elder Dickson said that he 
believed members in the chapter 
had been prepared for this day 
“with unique and God-given 
talents.” He said, “The Lord wants 
righteous, believing, and faithful 
people to stand as a light on the 
hill in these trying times. We 
must be some of those men and 
women.”
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c l a s s  o f  1 9 7 6
Conrad Houser became semiretired 
as president of Geovic Energy at the 
end of 2010. He continues as an expert 
legal witness in mining litigation and 
a due diligence consultant. Pro bono 
work continues to be one of his highest 
priorities.
Cheryl A. Russell died August 8, 2010, in 
Salt Lake City. She had served as Logan 
City Justice Court judge since 1992.
c l a s s  o f  1 9 7 7
David R. Bird was awarded the Patrick 
Conner Award for his distinguished 
service to the mining industry at the 95th 
Annual Convention of the Utah Mining 
Association. He was honored for his work 
as a trusted advisor and lobbyist for 
various Utah mining companies as well as 
the Utah Mining Association. According 
to the Utah Mining Association, Bird’s 
leadership, knowledge, and close working 
relationships with Utah’s government 
leaders and policy makers has been a 
great benefit to the mining industry for 
many years. Bird, a natural resources 
lawyer, has been a generous contributor 
to various charities and served on the 
Utah State Bar Commission and later  
as president of the bar. He also served  
on the Utah Foundation Board and  
the Utah Manufacturers Association 
board of directors. 
Douglas Holt is serving his 12th year as 
Graham County Superior Court judge 
in Safford, Arizona. He is a member 
of the Arizona Judicial Council and a 
senior member of the Presiding Judges 
Committee for the Arizona Judiciary.
Scott R. Jenkins was admitted to the 
Utah State Bar and the u.s. District 
Court, District of Utah, in 1978 and the 
u.s. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, 
in 1979. He has more than 30 years of 
experience advising individuals, entities, 
and charitable organizations on legal 
matters affecting their lives, families, 
and businesses, including business 
organization, public offerings, private 
placements, and sec reporting.
Stephen L. Roth was unanimously 
confirmed by the Utah Senate to be a 
judge on Utah’s Court of Appeals on 
February 26, 2009. He has been a judge 
in West Jordan since 2002 as well as 
an adjunct professor at the University 
of Utah.
c l a s s  o f  1 9 8 1
Charlene Barlow has been appointed to 
the Third Judicial District Court, which 
serves Salt Lake, Summit, and Tooele 
Counties. Prior to her appointment 
she served as the section chief of the 
Criminal Division of the Utah Attorney 
General’s Office, as the Provo City 
attorney, as the Orem City attorney, 
and as a prosecutor in the Utah County 
Attorney’s Office.
Glade Myler spoke on February 26, 2010, 
in Logan, Utah, as part of the College of 
Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences 
Distinguished Alumni Speakers Series at  
Utah State University. He is a senior 
deputy attorney general in Carson 
City, Nevada. Myler mainly practices 
administrative law, including emergency 
management and homeland security for 
the state of Nevada.
c l a s s  o f  1 9 8 2
Kenneth M. Anderson has joined Locke 
Lord Bissell & Liddell as a partner based 
in the firm’s Houston, Texas, office. He 
was formerly Vinson & Elkins’ syndicated 
finance practice group chair. His practice 
expertise is in energy finance.
M. James “Jim” Brady, former Mapleton 
City mayor, was confirmed by the Utah 
Senate as a judge of the Fourth District 
Court. He has been a partner in the 
Provo law firm Bradford & Brady for the 
past 24 years.
Stephen Mikita, Utah assistant attorney 
general, recently joined the board of 
directors of the Spinal Muscular Atrophy 
Foundation with four other experienced 
business, media, and law leaders. sma 
works to find a cure for Spinal Muscular 
Atrophy.
Monte J. Stiles was honored November  
17, 2010, by the Idaho State Bar with  
its Professionalism Award. Stiles has 
served as a federal prosecutor for the  
u.s. Attorney’s Office in Idaho since  
1987. From 1982 to 1987 he worked  
for the Ada County Prosecutor’s  
Office in Boise.
Kevin J Worthen was called as an 
Area Seventy in the April 2010 general 
conference of The Church of Jesus  
Christ of Latter-day Saints.
c l a s s  o f  1 9 8 3
Dane O. Leavitt, of Cedar City, Utah, 
was called as an Area Seventy in the 
April 2010 general conference of The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints.
D. James Tree is mentioned in a Yakima, 
Washington, newspaper article for 
mentoring his son-in-law in the state’s 
law clerk program. Students like Tree’s 
relative and paralegal, Tim Anderson, 
can take the bar without attending law 
school. Tree spends five to six hours a 
week in this work. His main legal practice 
is in disability law.
c l a s s  o f  1 9 8 4
David Lynch has recently been 
appointed chair of the Department 
of Criminal Justice at Weber State 
University in Ogden, Utah.
c l a s s  o f  1 9 8 5
Peter A. Thompson was appointed to 
the Maricopa County Superior Court 
by Arizona governor Jan Brewer. He 
currently is serving as a Maricopa 
County Superior Court commissioner in 
Phoenix.
c l a s s  o f  1 9 8 6
Sherene T. Dillon was appointed by  
Utah governor Gary R. Herbert to the 
Second District Juvenile Court (covering 
Davis, Morgan, and Weber Counties).  
She is currently with Utah’s Office of  
the Guardian Ad Litem. She will take 
office after being confirmed by the  
Utah State Senate.
Mitch Edwards is headphone company 
Skullcandy’s new chief financial officer 
and general counsel in Park City, Utah. 
He previously was cfo and general 
counsel for the software distributing 
company BitTorrent.
William Tilleman has worked on the 
Canada Energy Commission and has 
been a visiting professor at Harvard 
in addition to having other legal 
assignments. He is a federal justice for 
the Queen’s Bench of Alberta.
c l a s s  o f  1 9 8 8
Dan Curriden has accepted an  
in-house counsel position with aaa  
of Northern California, Nevada, and 
Utah. As of 2011 he and his wife have 
three next-generation Cougars at  
the Y and look forward to seeing a  
lot more of Provo.
Robert N. Johnson, an immigration 
attorney, joins as a shareholder the 
Atlanta, Georgia, offices of Baker, 
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & 
Berkowitz.
c l a s s  o f  1 9 8 9
David McGrath is a senior vice president 
and managing legal counsel for Zions 
First National Bank. 
c l a s s  o f  1 9 9 0
Matthew Bryan spoke at the aba 
Intellectual Property Law Conference in 
Washington, d.c. He works in Geneva, 
Switzerland, as the director of the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty Division of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization. Over 
140 countries are parties to the pct, 
which is an agreement for international 
cooperation in the field of patents.
c l a s s  o f  1 9 9 1
Michael F. Krieger ran with the bulls in 
Pamplona, finished his sixth marathon, 
and had one of his sons graduate from 
high school and enroll at byu. Mike has 
enjoyed growing the ip practice at Kirton 
& McConkie and is a little nervous about 
what life will be like as an empty nester.
Kumen Taylor is a partner with 
Hutchison & Steffen at its Bountiful, 
Utah, office. He practices primarily in the 
areas of civil and commercial litigation 
the spring issue of the clark  
memorandum publishes news of  
the graduates of j. reuben  
clark law school. because of  
space constraints, it is not  
always possible to publish every  
submission for the class notes.
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and also litigates cases involving 
employment and real estate law.
Erin Lee Truman is now of counsel to 
Hutchison & Steffen at its Las Vegas 
office. Erin is a trial lawyer and will 
head Hutchison & Steffen’s Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Department, which 
includes both mediation and arbitration.
c l a s s  o f  1 9 9 4
Gary Bryner, a political science 
professor and former Law School adjunct 
professor at byu, died March 10, 2010. 
He graduated from the Law School while 
teaching at byu.
Lauralyn Cabanilla is an attorney,  
member of the Provo City Council, and  
a lieutenant colonel in the u.s. Army 
Reserves. She will be going to Iraq in 
August to serve in the military.
Michael Rawlins has joined the law 
firm Durham Jones & Pinegar (djp). 
Michael is a shareholder in the firm’s 
Las Vegas office, doing commercial 
litigation, construction and mechanic’s 
lien litigation, real estate litigation, 
intellectual property litigation, and 
representation of creditors in bankruptcy 
proceedings.
Benjamin C. Stahmann was hired last 
month by Oklahoma State University 
Foundation in Stillwater, Oklahoma, 
to serve as its senior director of 
gift planning. His prior work was as 
director of tax and legal services with 
the National Boy Scouts of America 
Foundation in Irving, Texas.
Christopher L. Thomas joined 
the Denver office of the labor and 
employment law firm Ogletree, Deakins, 
Nash, Smoak & Stewart as a shareholder. 
He and three others formerly with the 
immigration practice group of Holland 
& Hart in Denver will serve as their 
new firm’s immigration practice 
group for the western United States. 
Christopher was a partner at Holland 
& Hart.
c l a s s  o f  1 9 9 6
Martin W. Bates was appointed the new 
superintendent of Granite School District 
in Salt Lake City, starting September 
1, 2010. He most recently was the 
assistant superintendent in the district 
over administrative and legal services. 
Martin has served as an assistant to the 
superintendent since 1999 and in other 
district administrative capacities since 
1997. Granite is the largest district in 
Utah, with 89 schools, 3,000 teachers, 
and 68,400 students.
David Moore, a byu law professor, 
was the main participant in an online 
symposium sponsored by the Virginia 
Journal of International Law. He discussed 
his recent essay in vjil: “Medellin, the 
Alien Tort Statute, and the Domestic 
Status of International Law.” David’s 
essay looks at the u.s. Supreme Court 
case Medellin v. Texas and its impact on 
the Alien Tort Statute in the context  
of how treaties are considered in 
American law. 
c l a s s  o f  1 9 9 7
James E. Lake, a patent lawyer,  
joined the ip law firm Zarian, Midgley  
& Johnson in Boise and Spokane.  
He was a shareholder at Wells  
St. John in Spokane. 
Elizabeth Sewell has been published  
in a coauthored casebook, Law and 
Religion: Cases in Context (Aspen 
Publishers Legal Education, 2010).  
The book is edited by Leslie C. Griffin  
of the University of Houston and has 
sections by 14 coauthors. Elizabeth is 
currently associate director at the 
International Center for Law and Religion 
Studies at J. Reuben Clark Law School.
c l a s s  o f  1 9 9 8
Richard C. Blake was named a partner  
at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati 
in Palo Alto, California, specializing 
in private and public offerings, public 
company representation, mergers and 
acquisitions, and corporate governance 
counseling. 
Dane Watkins Jr. has been elected 
to serve as a judge for the Seventh 
Judicial District in Idaho. His service 
on the bench follows nine years as the 
Bonneville County prosecuting attorney.
c l a s s  o f  1 9 9 9
Paul C. Farr was appointed by Herriman 
City to be its new justice court judge. 
Paul has been a partner with the law 
firm Morgan, Minnock, Rice & James 
in downtown Salt Lake City. He lives in 
Herriman, Utah.
Sarah Leeper was recently elected as a 
partner with the law firm Manatt, Phelps 
& Phillips llp. Sarah works in the firm’s 
San Francisco office, where her practice 
focuses on representing water, energy, 
and telecommunications companies 
in matters before the California Public 
Utilities Commission, fcc, and ferc. 
Sarah is married to Steven Egli, and they 
reside in Mill Valley, California.
Matt Martinez, an immigration attorney, 
was recently elected a shareholder at the 
Phoenix law firm Fennemore Craig.
c l a s s  o f  2 0 0 0
Patrick Malone has joined Barrick Gold 
of North America as senior counsel.
Clate Mask, the current president of 
Infusionsoft, was recently interviewed 
on a business blog  by entrepreneur 
Sramana Mitra.
c l a s s  o f  2 0 0 1
Jeffrey R.  “Jeff” Atkin was elected  
partner last week by the law firm Foley 
& Lardner in Los Angeles. A former 
senior counsel, Jeff works with energy, 
finance, transactional, and securities law.
c l a s s  o f  2 0 0 3
Chad B. Balfanz was promoted to 
major in the u.s. Army Judge Advocate 
General’s Corps. He previously taught 
constitutional law at West Point.  
Chad and his family currently reside  
in Charlottesville, Virginia, where he  
is pursuing an llm in international  
law. His wife, Cathy, gave birth to their  
third child, Tristan Chad Balfanz, in 
November 2010.
Michael P. Brooks is director of byu’s  
University Accessibility Center and  
president of the Utah Chapter of the 
Association on Higher Education and 
Disability (ahead). He was recently 
appointed as chair for the Disability  
Issues Advisory Committee at byu. 
A licensed psychologist, Michael will 
become an associate clinical professor  
in the Counseling and Career Center.
Edward L. Carter was a newspaper 
reporter before he went to law school  
and clerked for Judge Aldisert of the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Edward  
currently is an assistant communications 
professor and serves as the associate 
department chair of the Department of 
Communications at byu.
c l a s s  o f  2 0 0 4
Carolyn E. Howard was profiled in the  
Salt Lake Tribune, emphasizing her good 
work with students at Utah Valley 
University in Orem, Utah.
Carolina Núñez has just published an 
article that is now available on ssrn: 
“Fractured Membership: Deconstructing 
Territoriality to Secure Rights and 
Remedies for the Undocumented Worker,” 
Wisconsin Law Review, 2010.
c l a s s  o f  2 0 0 5
Ryan Bellows was a Twenty Under 40 
Award winner on November 4, 2010. 
These annual awards are given by the 
Reno Gazette-Journal “to exceptional 
business leaders under 40 years of age 
who work in the Greater Reno-Tahoe 
[Nevada] market.”
Ronald K. Fuller is the 2010 recipient 
of the LexisNexis John R. Johnson 
Memorial Scholarship, given to a law 
school graduate pursuing a library school 
degree. The scholarship was announced 
at the American Association of Law 
Libraries annual meeting in Denver, 
Colorado. Ronald currently is an assistant 
librarian and adjunct professor of law 
at the S. J. Quinney Law Library at the 
University of Utah in Salt Lake City.
Rob Mooney has started his own firm in 
Salt Lake City, the Law Office of Robert P. 
K. Mooney pllc, focusing on commercial 
litigation. Rob prepared to open his 
practice by working under the trial 
lawyers at Holme Roberts & Owen llp 
and Burbidge Mitchell & Gross, working 
exclusively in commercial litigation.
Lorianne Updike Toler found a 
previously unknown copy of the u.s. 
Constitution in November 2009  
while researching at the Historical 
Society of Pennsylvania.
c l a s s  o f  2 0 0 6
Paul S. Holdaway has become a 
shareholder of the intellectual property 
firm Wells St. John ps after four years 
as an associate attorney. His patent 
practice is focused on electrical and 
software technologies and includes 
client and inventor counseling, 
application preparation, and prosecution 
of applications before the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office.
Daniel C. Swinton has been elected 
as president of the Association for 
Student Conduct Administration (asca). 
The association has approximately 
1,700 members at over 700 colleges 
and universities nationwide. Daniel is 
currently assistant dean of students and 
director of student conduct and aca-
demic integrity at Vanderbilt University. 
He and his wife, Julia, live in Nashville, 
Tennessee, with their three children;  
they are expecting their fourth in May.
c l a s s  o f  2 0 0 8
Michelle Bushman is the lead author of 
a new geological study about a desert 
oasis near Death Valley, California. Her 
study looks at where the water comes 
from that flows out of the ground at 
Ash Meadows, Nevada, about 90 
miles northwest of Las Vegas on the 
California/Nevada border. The water 
feeds about 22,000 acres of wetlands 
in the middle of the desert at the 
oasis, which is home to the largest 
concentration of endemic life in a local 
area in the country. The study concludes 
that the water comes from the area of 
the Nevada Test Site, not from other 
areas as previously assumed. Michelle 
is an attorney with Ford & Huff in Lehi, 
Utah. She received both a master of 
science degree and a jd at byu in 2008.
c l a s s  o f  2 0 0 9
Benjamin Kearns has joined the law 
firm Best, Best & Krieger in their Ontario, 
California, office. He previously worked at 
the firm as a summer associate in 2008.
Tyler V. Snow has joined the law firm 
Christensen & Jensen. He concentrates 
his practice on product liability, 
insurance defense, commercial litigation, 
and personal injury.
David Stott has published an article that 
was originally a paper in the law school 
class “Joseph Smith and the Law,” taught 
by Professor Jack Welch. David was an 
associate at Cravath, Swaine & Moore in 
New York City prior to now clerking for a 
federal judge, also in New York.
the spring issue of the clark  
memorandum publishes news of  
the graduates of j. reuben  
clark law school. because of  
space constraints, it is not  
always possible to publish every  
submission for the class notes.
l i f e  i n  t h e  l a w
2011: A Year for  
Milestone Anniversaries  
of the Law School
Anniversaries remind us of the shoulders we stand on and of our obligation to  
make today something worth celebrating in the future.
The Clark Memorandum welcomes the submission of short essays and anecdotes from its
readers. Send your short article (750 words or less) for “Life in the Law” to wisej@law.byu.edu.
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40th  
anniversary
–––––  
The first announcement 
of J. Reuben Clark  
Law School was on 
March 9, 1971,  
when Harold B. Lee, 
president of The  
Church of Jesus Christ  
of Latter-day Saints,  
made known both the 
building of a new  
law school at byu and 
the retirement  
of then byu president  
Ernest L. Wilkinson.
35th  
anniversary 
––––– 
The first graduating 
class of byu  
Law School received  
jd diplomas  
on April 18, 1976.  
140th  
anniversary
––––– 
The birth of J. Reuben 
Clark Jr. was on 
September 1, 1871, in 
Grantsville, Utah.
50th  
anniversary
–––––  
The death of  
J. Reuben Clark Jr.  
was on October  
6, 1961, in Salt Lake  
City, Utah.
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